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INTRODUCTION
An array of emerging scientific and technological innovations
promises to reshape contemporary society. The healthcare, financial, and
agricultural sectors, among others, stand to be transformed by innovations
in areas such as nanotechnology,1 information technology,2 and biotech1

See Vincent Mangematin & Steve Walsh, The Future of Nanotechnologies, 32
TECHNOVATION 157, 157 (2012) (“[N]anotechnologies promise greater and more equal
access to knowledge and information; new therapeutic interventions; improved
environmental monitoring; greater safety and security; expanded communication capacities
and many other industrial and societal applications.”); Hailmichael Teshome Demissie,
Taming Matter for the Welfare of Humanity: Regulating Nanotechnology, in REGULATING
TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 327–
40 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (describing the “transformative
potential” of nanotechnology).
2
See Sagarmay Deb, Information Technology, Its Impact on Society and Its Future, 4
ADVANCES IN COMPUTING 25, 25–29 (2014) (discussing the past and potential future impacts
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nology.3 In addition to their transformative potential, these innovations are
notable for the unprecedented rate at which they have emerged and continue
to evolve.4 As a growing body of literature observes, such technologies pose
unique challenges to U.S. legal institutions, outrunning the normal pace of
legal change and placing pressure on regulators to creatively deal with their
rise.5 This tension between innovation and the law is forcing regulators,
of information technologies on business, medicine, education, and government); see also
Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technologies, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2001)
(speculating that innovations in “satellite [technologies], the Internet, and other information
technologies will lead to the greatest revolution in information since the invention of the
printing press”).
3
See Ronald Evens & Kenneth Kaitin, The Evolution of Biotechnology and its Impact on
Health Care, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 210, 218 (2015) (observing that biotechnology has and
will continue to produce a “continuing stream of novel medicines” which will have an
“extraordinary impact” on health care); STEWART BRAND, THE CLOCK OF THE LONG NOW:
TIME AND RESPONSIBILITY 13–14 (2000) (arguing that biological knowledge grows at an
“exponential” rate and is transforming the “agriculture, nutrition, and healthcare” industries).
4
See Braden Allenby, The Dynamics of Emerging Technology Systems, in INNOVATIVE
GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 19–43 (Gary E. Marchant et al. ed., 2013)
(arguing that the evolutionary pace and complexity of new emerging technologies, including
nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, and information technologies, are unprecedented); RAY
KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR (2005) (documenting the accelerating rate of
technological change); DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE, LITTLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE…AND BEYOND
(1986) (arguing that the number of “important discoveries” has doubled every 20 years); Gordon
E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, TECH. DIGEST, 1975, at 11–13 (arguing
that computing power doubles every 18-24 months); see also Rita Gunther McGrath, The Pace
of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 25, 2013), https://hbr.
org/2013/11/the-pace-of-technology-adoption-is-speeding-up [https://perma.cc/7DZW-WU5L]
(summarizing several empirical analyses of the increasing rates of introduction and adoption of
new technologies); Ilkka Tuomi, Kurzweil, Moore, and Accelerating Change 1–9 (Inst. for
Prospective Tech. Studies, Working Paper, 2003), http://meaningprocessing.com/personalPages/
tuomi/articles/Kurzweil.pdf (same).
5
See INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Gary E. Marchant et
al. eds., 2013) (collecting essays on the incongruous rate at which the law and some emerging
technologies evolve); THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGALETHICAL OVERSIGHT (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (same); REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES:
LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES (Roger Brownsword &
Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (same); see also U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-302,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 3 (1986)
(“Once a relatively slow and ponderous process, technological change is now outpacing the legal
structure that governs the system . . . .”); Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and
Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Commun-ications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 497–
98 (2009) (“[M]arket sectors featuring rapid and dynamic technological change . . . challenge the
policymaker’s ability to predict, control, and manage the system’s behavior.”); David Rejeski,
The Next Small Thing, 21 ENVTL. F. 42, 45 (2004) (“We have moved into . . . a . . . world
dominated by rapid improvements in products, processes, and organizations, all moving at rates
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policymakers, and scholars to consider whether and how the law should
respond to rapidly emerging technologies—a challenge centered on the need
to simultaneously balance both public safety and the promotion of tantalizing
social, economic, and environmental benefits.6
One of the most promising innovations in this cohort of rapidly
emerging and potentially transformative technologies is autonomous vehicles.7
It is widely agreed that autonomous vehicles have the potential to revolutionize
personal and commercial transportation.8 In particular, autonomous vehicles
that exceed the ability of our traditional governing institutions to adapt or shape outcomes. If you
think that any existing regulatory framework can keep pace with this rate of change, think
again.”); John H. Pearson, Regulating in the Face of Technological Advance: Who Makes These
Calls Anyway?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–2 (1999) (suggesting that
technological advances are now “so fast and furious that they raise severe doubts about how and
if the legal and governmental structures of western democracy . . . can respond”).
6
See Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 75, 75
(2009) (“The challenge is how to simultaneously leverage a promising innovation’s anticipated
benefits while guarding against its potential risks . . . .”); Christopher Bosso, The Enduring
Embrace: The Regulatory Ancien Régime and Governance of Nanomaterials in the U.S., 9
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 381, 381 (2013) (framing the regulation of technological
innovations as the challenge of balancing potential benefits against potential risks and negative
impacts); Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
350, 375 (2007) (describing in similar terms “the challenge” of regulating nanotechnology as that
of “address[ing] health and environmental concerns without crippling [a] promising industry”).
7
As used in this article, the term “autonomous vehicle” refers to fully autonomous vehicles,
or autonomous vehicles which require no active human control. See generally SOCIETY OF
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO ON-ROAD
MOTOR VEHICLE AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS (2016) (outlining a taxonomy for motor
vehicle automation). Although intermediate levels of automation are already available in the
marketplace, see Kersten Heineke et al., Self-Driving Car Technology: When Will the Robots
Hit the Road?, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 17, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/self-driving-car-technology-when-will-the-robots-hitthe-road [https://perma.cc/5UX2-JWXE], full automation poses the greatest challenge to
existing regulatory structures because it eliminates an historical constant: human drivers; see
generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal in the United
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 412 (2014) (discussing comprehensively the challenge of
regulating autonomous vehicles under existing domestic and international law).
8
See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES
POLICY 5 (2016) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2016] (“The development of advanced
automated vehicle . . . technologies . . . may prove to be the greatest personal transportation
revolution since the popularization of the personal automobile nearly a century ago.”); JAMES
A. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE FOR
POLICYMAKERS xiii (2016) [hereinafter RAND REPORT] (“Autonomous vehicle (AV)
technology offers the possibility of fundamentally changing transportation.”); ENO CTR. FOR
TRANSP., PREPARING A NATION FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: OPPORTUNITIES, BARRIERS
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2013) [hereinafter ENO REPORT] (“AVs have the
potential to fundamentally alter transportation systems . . . .”).
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promise to deliver significant social, economic, and environmental benefits to
both consumers and businesses. These benefits include a drastic reduction in
the number traffic fatalities and injuries, significant gains in individual
productivity, unprecedented mobility for the elderly and disabled populations,
greater flexibility in urban planning, and a reduction in harmful vehicle
emissions.9 As automobile manufacturers and technology firms race closer to
the technological viability of fully autonomous vehicles, the hypothesized
benefits of these vehicles are closer than ever to becoming a reality.10
Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles is far
from guaranteed. One significant potential obstacle is the legal environment
within which they must continue to develop and operate. Although regulation
can help to facilitate the commercial success of emerging technologies,11 as well
as manage their potential risks,12 it also has potential drawbacks.13 In the context
of autonomous vehicles, attempts to overcome the incongruous rates at which
the law and automation technologies evolve may lead to suboptimal outcomes.14
Indeed, the most common responses to this “pacing problem”15 generate their
own impediments to the widespread commercial adopt of autonomous vehicle
technologies.16 The challenge of regulating autonomous vehicles, as such, is to
identify a regulatory approach which addresses the tension between innovation
and regulation in a way which maximizes potential benefits and minimizes
9

See infra Part I.A (discussing the potential benefits of autonomous vehicles).
See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 74 (“Efforts of the last 15 years, first by universities
and then by industry, have brought this technology to near readiness.”).
11
See, e.g., Larry Downes, The Right and Wrong Way to Regulate Self-Driving Cars, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/the-right-and-wrong-ways-to-regulate-self-drivingcars [https://perma.cc/3JK8-4TX5] (“Done correctly, an evolving legal system can encourage
optimal investment in technologies that will increase social welfare, public safety, and sustainable
energy consumption, as well as positively impact labor markets, land use, public health, and
more.”).
12
See, e.g., WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 7–53 (2005), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/1
39578e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JK8-4TX5] (defending the role of regulation in minimizing
risks to public health and safety in the face of scientific and technological uncertainty).
13
See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 10 (2013) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2013]
(“[T]he agency recognizes that premature regulation can run the risk of putting the brakes on
the evolution toward increasingly better vehicle safety technologies.”).
14
See infra Part II.B (analyzing the impacts of different regulatory approaches on the
commercial success of their target technologies, including autonomous vehicles).
15
Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in
THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT
23 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (coining the phrase “pacing problem”).
16
See infra Part II.B (arguing further that traditional approaches to managing the pacing
problem may directly or indirectly deprive society of the benefits of autonomous vehicles).
10
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potential risks. In this article, I directly address that challenge and offer a novel
approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles informed by the principles of
planned adaptive regulation.
In Part I, I briefly summarize the most significant anticipated benefits
of autonomous vehicles and outline the regulatory environment within which
autonomous vehicles currently operate. In Part II, I closely examine the
unique regulatory challenge posed by rapidly evolving technologies like
autonomous vehicles and identify three common responses to that challenge.
In doing so, I draw on Part I to illustrate each response in the context of
autonomous vehicle regulation and describe the way in which each could
hamper the adoption of autonomous vehicle technologies. Finally, in Part III,
I offer an approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles which aims to
address the shortcomings of existing regulatory approaches and adds to the
nascent literature on adaptive regulation. I argue that any system for
regulating autonomous vehicles must directly address the limited reactive and
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions, rather than circumvent these
limitations by attempting to perfect regulatory frameworks ex ante. To
operationalize this evolutionary paradigm, I propose a new approach
informed by the principles of planned adaptive regulation.
I. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CURRENT REGULATION
OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
The potential benefits of autonomous vehicles are substantial.17 As
former Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx remarked in 2016, “[t]he
development of advanced automated vehicle . . . technologies . . . may prove
to be the greatest personal transportation revolution since the popularization
of the personal automobile nearly a century ago.”18 Although the technology
for full automation continues to develop,19 widespread commercial adoption
of autonomous vehicle technology promises to deliver a wide range of social,
economic, and environmental benefits.20 The precise magnitude of these
benefits is difficult to predict, but existing research suggests that the net
17

See generally Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars,
73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 35–43 (2017) (providing a detailed discussion of the likely
benefits of autonomous vehicles).
18
NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 5.
19
See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
IMPLEMENTATION PREDICTIONS 10–13 (2018) (describing the limits of existing autonomous
vehicle technology and deployment).
20
See generally RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 9–36 (providing an overview of the likely
benefits of autonomous vehicles); Pearl, supra note 17, at 35–43 (same).
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impact of autonomous vehicles will be significant.21 In this Part, I briefly
summarize the most significant of these predicted benefits and describe the
regulatory environment within which autonomous vehicle technology must
continue to develop and operate.
A. The Potential Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles
1. Transportation Safety
The most notable predicted benefit of autonomous vehicle technology
is a substantial reduction in the human and economic toll of traffic
accidents.22 In 2016, there were more than 7.2 million reported vehicle
accidents resulting in 3.14 million injured people and over 37,000 deaths.23
According to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA), 94 percent of all vehicle crashes are attributable to human error.24
These sources of error include, but are not limited to, “driving too fast,
21

See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Autonomous Cars: Self-Driving the New Auto Industry
Paradigm, Blue Paper (2013) (discussing economic benefits); Daniel J. Fagant & Kara M.
Kockelman, The Travel and Environmental Implications of Shared Autonomous Vehicles,
Using Agent-Based Model Scenarios, 40 TRANSP. RESEARCH PART C 1, 8–10 (2013)
(discussing environmental benefits); Pearl, supra note 17, at 35–39 (discussing public health
benefits). The realization of these benefits will not necessarily have a perfectly linear
correlation with the market saturation of autonomous vehicles. Instead, the majority of
benefits may not be realized until autonomous vehicles constitute a certain minimum
percentage of the overall vehicle population. Similarly, autonomous vehicles may impose
new costs, such as displacing existing institutions, services, and jobs. On balance, however,
the benefits of autonomous vehicles are likely to far outweigh their costs. See MORGAN
STANLEY, supra note 21, at 7 (estimating total net economic benefits of more than $1.3 trillion
annually in the U.S. and $5.6 trillion annually across the globe once autonomous vehicles reach
peak market penetration).
22
In its 2016 policy statement, NHTSA hailed autonomous vehicle technology as a “potentially
unprecedented advance in safety on U.S. roads and highways.” NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra
note 8, at 5.
23
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
2016 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 1 (2017), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/
Public/Publication/812456 [https://perma.cc/FA5C-PN9H]; Traffic Safety Facts Annual
Report Tables: National Statistics, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://cdan.
nhtsa.gov/tsftables/National%20Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ENQ-9XQZ].
24
Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.
nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles [https://perma.cc/2WVR-DJPX] (last
visited Aug. 18, 2018). In addition, “[e]ven when the critical reason behind a crash is
attributed to the vehicle, roadway or environment, additional human factors . . . are regularly
found to have contributed to the crash occurrence and/or injury severity.” ENO REPORT,
supra note 8, at 3.
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misjudging other drivers’ behaviors, alcohol impairment, distraction, and
fatigue.”25 Indeed, impairment, distractions, and fatigue alone account for
over 50 percent of all fatal crashes.26 The use of autonomous vehicles could
significantly reduce the incidence of such crashes, as vehicles with no human
operators are never drunk, distracted, fatigued, or otherwise susceptible to
human failings.27 In addition, any reduction in accidents would offer
significant economic benefits in the form of fewer hospital stays, days of
work missed, lives lost, and instances of property damage, among other
savings.28 In 2015 alone, vehicle crashes cost the U.S. economy $300 billion,
or 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), meaning that even a 25
percent reduction in accidents could save nearly $100 billion annually.29
25

Shaping the Future of Autonomous Vehicles: How Policymakers Can Promote Safety,
Mobility, and Efficiency in an Uncertain World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp.,
Housing and Urban Dev., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th
Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Nidhi Kalra, Senior Info. Scientist, RAND Corp.) [hereinafter
Kalra Testimony] (citations omitted).
26
Id. (adding together all crash data due to drunk, distracted, or fatigued drivers).
27
See Neal Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688 (2014)
(estimating that 90 percent market penetration would prevent over 4 million crashes annually).
Indeed, “most autonomous vehicle researchers agree that fully autonomous vehicles can
drastically improve highway safety.” Pearl, supra note 17, at 38 n.122 (providing a comprehensive review of research to this effect); see also Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., U.S. DOT, National Safety Council Launch ‘Road to Zero’ Coalition to End Roadway
Fatalities (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-national-safetycouncil-launch-road-zero-coalition-end-roadway-fatalities
[https://perma.cc/HD3U-B2XN]
(“With the rapid introduction of automated vehicles . . . the Department believes it is now
increasingly likely that the vision of zero road deaths and serious injuries can be achieved in the
next 30 years.”). Autonomous vehicles could also improve the avoidance of others, such as
pedestrians, who are still prone to human error. Cf. RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 n.3 (noting
further that “49 percent of pedestrians killed by motor vehicles are under the influence of alcohol”
and that “38 percent of cyclists killed by motor vehicles are under the influence of alcohol”). Still,
autonomous vehicles might not eliminate all accidents. For instance, “inclement weather and
complex driving environments pose challenges for autonomous vehicles, as well as for human
drivers, and autonomous vehicles might perform worse than human drivers in some cases. There
is also the potential for autonomous vehicles to pose new and serious crash risks—for example,
crashes resulting from cyberattacks.” Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 2–3 (citations omitted).
28
See ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 8; see also NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 1
(“Preventing significant numbers of crashes will, in addition to relieving the enormous
emotional toll on families, also greatly reduce the enormous related societal costs . . . that
total in the hundreds of billions of dollars each year.”).
29
ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also Adam Ozimek, The Massive Economic Benefits
of Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehave
ior/2014/11/08/the-massive-economic-benefits-of-self-driving-cars/#127de25b68d9 [https://
perma.cc/2C3M-TK5L] (estimating in the alternative that all crashes combined cost the U.S.
economy a total of $543 billion annually).
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2. Access to Transportation
Another important potential benefit of autonomous vehicle
technology is increased mobility for populations currently unable or not
permitted to operate traditional vehicles. These populations include older
citizens, the disabled, people too young to drive, and others without a driver’s
license.30 As Clyde Terry, Chair of the National Council on Disability,
recently testified before Congress, “a lack of reliable and accessible
transportation remains one of the biggest deterrents to employment and
community involvement” for members of these populations.31 In turn, the
widespread use of autonomous vehicles could dramatically increase the
mobility of a wide range of people unable to operate traditional vehicles and
have a transformative effect on their productivity, social wellbeing, and
physical and mental health.32 Similarly, any increased freedom and independence experienced by such populations could translate into gains in the
productivity and wellbeing of caretakers, guardians, and family members.
3. Traffic Congestion and Land Use
In addition to making transportation safer and more accessible,
autonomous vehicles could reduce congestion and change the way in which
cities are planned. There are two ways in which autonomous vehicles could
reduce congestion. First, although autonomous vehicles may lead to an
increase in overall vehicle miles traveled,33 they have the potential to
“support higher vehicle throughput rates on existing roads.”34 In particular,
30

RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 16–17.
Hands Off: The Future of Self-Driving Cars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Science,
Tech., & Transp., 114th Cong. 1, 4 (2016) (statement of Clyde Terry, Chair, Nat’l Council
on Disability).
32
Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 6–8; see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SELFDRIVING CARS: MAPPING ACCESS TO A TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 11 (2015), http://
www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_AutomatedVehiclesReport_508-PDF.pdf (“AVs will
change the world for everyone, but the most dramatic impact could be for people with
disabilities and people who are aging . . . . AVs can become an essential component of their
independence, economic development, and well-being.”); cf. RAND REPORT, supra note 8,
at xv (“Some of these [benefits] are currently provided by mass transit or paratransit
agencies, but each of these alternatives has significant disadvantages. Mass transit generally
requires fixed routes that may not serve people where they live and work [and] [p]aratransit
services are expensive because they require a trained, salaried, human driver.”).
33
See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 17–21.
34
Id. at 21. Throughput rate is a measurement of the total number of vehicles moving
between point A and point B within a given period of time. Id.
31
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autonomous vehicles’ ability to “constantly monitor surrounding traffic and
respond with finely tuned braking and acceleration adjustments should enable
[them] to travel safely at higher speeds and with reduced headway (space)
between each vehicle.”35 Second, autonomous vehicles have the potential to
drastically reduce congestion stemming from traffic accidents.36 According
to one estimate, accident-related congestion accounts for 25 percent of all
congestion delays.37 In turn, because autonomous vehicles have the potential
to prevent the vast majority of accidents, they could “eliminat[e] an
appreciable share of all traffic delays.”38 These reductions would also carry
weighty economic implications, as congestion is estimated to cost the U.S.
over $160 billion annually.39
A reduction in congestion and other changes in vehicle behavior could
also positively impact existing patterns of land use. This impact would fall
into two categories. First, autonomous vehicles could significantly reduce the
amount of space devoted to vehicle parking within crowded urban areas.40
The proximity of a vehicle owner to the parking place of an autonomous
vehicle is far less relevant since autonomous vehicles could park themselves
in remote locations and appear at a desired location upon request.41 As
population density in urban areas continues to skyrocket,42 parking lots and
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id. at 23.
38
Id.
39
David Schrank et al., 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard, TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST. 1 (2015).
This figure includes additional expenses (e.g., fuel) and opportunity costs (e.g., lost productivity).
Id. Another estimate places the cost at closer to $100 billion annually. See Adeel Lari et. al., SelfDriving Vehicles and Policy Implications: Current Status of Autonomous Vehicle Development
and Minnesota Policy Implications, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 735, 752 (2015) (“Increases in
capacity ultimately mean more convenient travel and reductions in congestion, which currently
costs Americans $100 billion in wasted fuel and lost time, according to some reports.”).
40
See David Levinson, Climbing Mount Next: The Effects of Autonomous Vehicles on
Society, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 787, 805 (2015) (describing how autonomous vehicles
would allow parking spaces to be “repurposed”).
41
See id. (“Autonomous vehicles can drop off their passenger at the front door, and then park
themselves in far less space than drivers currently require (or move on to their next passenger),
and that space need not be so close to the most valuable urban areas.”).
42
The United Nations (UN) estimates that, in 2010, a staggering 82 percent of the U.S. population
already lived in urban areas. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 133 (2011), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pub
lications/pdf/urbanization/WUP2011_Report.pdf. It is further projected that “84.4 percent of
Americans will live in urban areas [by 2020], with more than 28 percent living in urban areas of
more than five million people.” CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT
REVOLUTION 8 (2012) (citation omitted).
36

Vol. 4:1]

Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation

91

garages are projected to occupy increasingly valuable urban space, leading to
“urban dead zones.”43 In some U.S. cities, “parking lots cover more than a
third of the land area, becoming the single most salient feature of our built
environment.”44 Autonomous vehicles offer an opportunity to repurpose such
space for more socially and economically productive uses.45 Second, because
autonomous vehicles allow their owners to engage in other activities while
riding, individuals and firms may be more willing to “locate further away
from the urban core.”46 This would help to alleviate urban crowding and
make more affordable peripheral housing accessible and practical for those
who cannot afford urban housing.47
4. Energy and Emissions
Finally, autonomous vehicle technology has the potential to reduce
both energy consumption and pollution. Several factors could improve fuel
economy in autonomous vehicles relative to traditional vehicles. These
factors include efficiencies gained through smoother acceleration and
deceleration, reduced distance between vehicles, and increased roadway
capacity.48 In addition, given their potential to virtually eliminate traffic
accidents, autonomous vehicles could be lighter than conventional vehicles,
shedding the materials necessary to meet rigorous crash-test standards.49 Less
obviously, autonomous vehicles may also help to reduce emissions by
43

CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., supra note 42, at 8.
ERAN BEN-JOSEPH, RETHINKING A LOT: THE DESIGN AND CULTURE OF PARKING xi
(2012).
45
See, e.g., ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 20 (estimating that each autonomous vehicle will
save $250 in annual parking costs).
46
RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 26.
47
See id. at 27 (“AVs could support even greater dispersion of low-density development
along the outskirts of major metropolitan areas given the ability of owners to engage in other
activities as vehicles pilot themselves.”).
48
See Levinson, supra note 40, at 796–97 (“Because they are safer, autonomous vehicles can
have shorter headways.”), 805–06 (“Fuel costs on the other hand should be lower, as
autonomous vehicles are likely to be more efficient, both due to less congestion and to more
optimized driving styles . . . .”); ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 4–5 (“Under various levels of
AV adoption congestion savings due to ACC measures and traffic monitoring systems could
smooth traffic flows by seeking to minimize accelerations and braking in freeway traffic.”);
CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., supra note 42, at 26, 31 (“A transportation system composed
of self-driving vehicles would decrease energy consumption in at least three primary ways:
more efficient driving; lighter, more fuel-efficient vehicles; and efficient infrastructure.”).
49
Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 11. This benefit would, of course, require near universal
adoption of autonomous vehicle technology as crash risks would persist so long as human
drivers remain on the road.
44
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enabling the use of alternative fuels.50 For example, “if the decrease in
frequency of crashes allows lighter vehicles, many of the range issues that
have limited the use of electric and other alternative vehicles [would be]
diminished.”51 Similarly, the ability of autonomous vehicles to drop off
passengers and then drive to refuel themselves could “permit a viable system
with fewer refueling stations than would otherwise be required.”52
B. The Current Regulatory Environment for Autonomous Vehicles
The legal environment within which autonomous vehicles and their
associated benefits must continue to develop remains in a nascent stage. It is
generally accepted that, absent specific laws or regulations to the contrary,
autonomous vehicles are legal in the United States.53 Although well over half
of all states have enacted legislation or issued executive orders related to
autonomous vehicles, only a fraction of these laws impose or authorize the
creation of binding regulatory mandates.54 Similarly, the federal government,
acting through NHTSA, has taken a laissez-faire approach and declined to
initiate any rulemakings in the area of autonomous vehicle design or
50

See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 33–36 (considering how autonomous vehicles may
“enable and accelerate specific competitive aspects of alternative vehicles and fuels”).
51
Id. at xvi.
52
Id. at xvi–xvii. One recent study even showed that sharing electronic autonomous vehicles
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions 87–94 percent by 2030 relative to current
conventional vehicles. Jeffery B. Greenblatt & Samveg Saxena, Autonomous Taxis Could
Greatly Reduce Greenhouse-Gas Emissions of US Light-Duty Vehicles, 5 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 860, 860–62 (2015). But see RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at xvii (“[D]ecreases in
the cost of driving, and additions to the pool of vehicle users (e.g., elderly, disabled, and
those under 16)[,] are likely to result in an increase in overall [vehicle miles traveled]. While
it seems likely that the decline in fuel consumption and emissions would outweigh any such
increase, it is uncertain.”).
53
See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 11 (“[I]f a vehicle is compliant within the existing
FMVSS regulatory framework and maintains a conventional vehicle design, there is currently no
specific federal legal barrier to . . . being offered for sale.”); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. ADMIN.,
Understanding NHTSA’s Regulatory Tools 2 (2016) (“It is important to note that NHTSA does
not prohibit the introduction of new motor vehicles or motor vehicle technologies into the vehicle
fleet, provided those vehicles and technologies meet existing FMVSS.”); see also Smith, supra
note 7, at 516 (conducting an extensive review of existing domestic and international law and
concluding that autonomous vehicles are most likely legal in the United States).
54
See Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicle Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL List], http://www.ncsl.org/research/transport
ation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx#Enacted%20Auton
omous%20Vehicle%20Legislation [https://perma.cc/T37B-3MGU] (listing and providing a
searchable interface of all proposed and enacted state autonomous vehicle legislation).
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performance.55 There is, effectively, a blank canvas just starting to be filled
by federal and state regulators. In the following section, I briefly describe the
most recent slate of federal regulatory proposals and summarize the
regulatory actions taken at the state level.
1. Federal Regulation
The federal government has maintained a permissive posture toward
autonomous vehicle technology.56 In addition to voicing its support and
aspirations for the widespread commercial adoption of autonomous vehicle
technology,57 NHTSA has refrained from mandating technology-specific
design features and performance standards.58 In its most recent policy
55

See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS
2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY ii (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2017] (offering non-binding
guidance to industry and state actors); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8 (same); NHTSA
POLICY 2013, supra note 13 (same).
56
NHTSA is responsible for regulating vehicle safety and performance. 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (“The
Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor vehicle safety standards.”); 49 U.S.C. §
30102(a)(9) (“‘[M]otor vehicle safety’ means the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring
because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable
risk of death or injury in an accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.”); 49
U.S.C. § 30102(a)(10) (“‘[M]otor vehicle safety standard’ means a minimum standard for motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance.”). Traditionally, states have been responsible for
regulating other aspects of vehicle operation. See Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory
Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1435
(2012) (“[NHTSA] does not regulate the actions of vehicle owners, the operation of motor vehicles
on public roads, or the maintenance and repair of vehicles-in-use.”); see also NHTSA POLICY
2017, supra note 55, at 20 (“State[ ] responsibilities [include] . . . licensing human drivers and
registering motors vehicles in their jurisdictions; enacting and enforcing traffic laws and
regulations; conducting safety inspections . . . ; [and] regulating motor vehicle insurance and
liability.”). Although the distinction between the vehicle and its driver is increasingly blurred in the
context of autonomous vehicles, NHTSA has signaled its intent to maintain exclusive control over
vehicle design and performance. Id. (“DOT strongly encourages States to allow DOT alone to
regulate the safety design and performance aspects of ADS technology. If a State does pursue ADS
performance-related regulations, that State should consult with NHTSA.”).
57
See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii (“[A]utomated vehicle technologies possess
the potential to save thousands of lives, as well as reduce congestion, enhance mobility, and
improve productivity. The Federal Government wants to ensure it does not impede progress with
unnecessary or unintended barriers to innovation.”); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 6
(“Recognizing [their] great potential, this Policy sets out an ambitious approach to accelerate the
[autonomous vehicle] revolution.”); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 1 (reflecting a
similar sentiment).
58
See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii, 2 (reaffirming NHTSA’s commitment to a
“nonregulatory approach” to autonomous vehicle safety and offering “recommendations and
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statement,59 the agency offered a “nonregulatory approach” to autonomous
vehicle safety.60 To that end, the document outlined 12 vehicle performance
guidelines for industry participants to “consider” as they develop, test, and
deploy autonomous vehicles on public roadways.61 The guidelines cover
broad categories such as “system safety,” “human machine interface,” and
“crashworthiness.”62 Although NHTSA encouraged industry participants to
submit a “Safety Self-Assessment” describing their treatment of each
guideline, it emphasized that doing so is “entirely voluntary” and that there
is no “compliance or enforcement mechanism” for its recommendations.63
In short, the policy statement signaled to industry participants that they are
free to engage in “testing [and] deployment” without any pre-approval from
the agency.64
suggestions” to industry and state actors); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 6, 11
(emphasizing NHTSA’s use of “agency guidance rather than . . . rulemaking” and that, although
elements of the guidance may become binding in the future, it is “not [presently] mandatory”);
see also William J. Kohler & Alex Colbert-Taylor, Current Law and Potential Legal Issues
Pertaining to Automated, Autonomous, and Connected Vehicles, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 99, 105 (2015) (“[T]he U.S. federal government has not attempted to regulate autonomous
motor vehicles as such.”).
59
The prior policy statements were published in 2013 and 2016. See NHTSA POLICY 2016,
supra note 8 (updating the 2013 policy); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13 (articulating
the first federal policy).
60
NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii.
61
Id. at 2.
62
Id. at 5, 10, 12.
63
Id. at 2, 16. Although the new guidance does not materially change any existing elements
of federal policy toward autonomous vehicles—a policy which has always been premised on
voluntary compliance—it does change the trajectory of that policy. In 2016, for example,
NHTSA looked poised to mandate autonomous vehicle-specific safety standards and the
submission of self-assessments. See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 100 (identifying
as “next steps” the mandatory “submission of [a] Safety Assessment” and promulgation of
“a new FMVSS”). The new guidance, however, makes clear that NHTSA does not intend to
pursue either measure. The new guidance also abandons four proposed changes to NHTSA’s
statutory authorities and internal processes, including a pre-market approval process. See id.
at 63-82 (describing “regulatory tools and authorities . . . [with] potential to facilitate the
expeditious and safe introduction of [automated vehicles]”). The 2017 guidance thus sends
a clear message that NHTSA intends to act as an aggregator of best practices and post-market
safety net, not a hands-on participant in the pre-market design process.
64
NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 16 (“NHTSA does not require that entities provide
submissions nor are they required to delay testing or deployment. Assessments are not subject to
Federal approval.”); see also Adam Thierer & Jennifer Huddleston Skees, Big Questions About
NHTSA’s “Soft Law” Driverless Cars Guidance, PLAIN TEXT (Sept. 13, 2017), https://
readplaintext.com/big-questions-about-nhtsas-soft-law-driverless-cars-guidance-e9da327a7522
[https://perma.cc/KMQ8-ZYMQ] (“[T]he agency had previously hinted that it might consider a
‘pre-market approval approach — used either in conjunction with or as a replacement for DOT’s
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The lack of technology-specific regulations, however, does not mean that
autonomous vehicles are unregulated at the federal level. To the contrary,
NHTSA has been careful to remind manufacturers that they must comply with
existing mandates applicable to conventional vehicles.65 Under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,66 the agency uses notice and comment
rulemaking to create design, construction, and performance standards, known as
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), applicable to all motor
vehicles.67 A manufacturer must self-certify compliance with each applicable
standard absent a specific exemption from the agency.68 Although NHTSA lacks
the authority to pre-approve or block new vehicle designs or technologies before
they come to market, it may test commercially available vehicles and pursue
enforcement actions if a vehicle fails to meet an applicable FMVSS.69 In addition,
NHTSA may order a vehicle or equipment recall if it identifies a “defect” posing
an “unreasonable risk to safety.”70 This authority applies “notwithstanding the
existing self-certification and compliance testing process.’ But that suggestion has now been
abandoned . . . .”).
65
See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 3 (“NHTSA has broad enforcement authority
to address existing and new automotive technologies and equipment.”); NHTSA POLICY
2016, supra note 8, at 7 (“NHTSA will continue to exercise its available regulatory authority
over [autonomous vehicles] using its existing regulatory tools . . . .”); NHTSA Enforcement
Guidance Bulletin 2016–02: Safety-Related Defects and Automated Safety Technologies, 81
Fed. Reg. 65,706 (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin] (“[T]his
Guidance aims to increase awareness of NHTSA’s enforcement authority over motor vehicle
equipment in all of its various forms.”).
66
Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.)
67
See 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor vehicle
safety standards.”); 49 C.F.R. § 553 (2017) (listing procedures for adopting rules); see also
NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 49 (“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the tool the
Agency uses to adopt new standards, modify existing standards, or repeal an existing
standard.”). The FMVSS are codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.101–571.500.
68
See 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (describing the self-certification process); 49 U.S.C. §§ 30113-30114
(describing the circumstances under which temporary exemptions may be granted). In addition
to exemptions, the public may also request a letter of interpretation from NHTSA. See NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION ADMIN., Understanding NHTSA’s Regulatory Tools 2–3 (2016).
Interpretation letters and rulings on exemptions have “historically . . . taken several months to
several years” for the agency to issue. NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 49.
69
See 49 U.S.C. § 30112(a); see also NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,707
(stating that NHTSA’s enforcement authority under the National Traffic Safety and Motor
Vehicle Act “includes investigations, administrative proceedings, civil penalties, and other civil
enforcement actions”).
70
NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65, 707–08 (explaining how NHTSA
determines whether a defect exists and, if so, whether it poses an unreasonable risk to safety);
see also 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(3) (defining “defect,” in a circular fashion, as any “defect in
performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment”); 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as an “unreasonable
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presence or absence of an FMVSS.”71 Thus, as applied to autonomous vehicles,
NHTSA has the authority to create and enforce FMVSS and, separately, to recall
vehicles that otherwise pose an “unreasonable risk to safety.”72
As of the time of this writing, Congress is also considering two pieces of
autonomous vehicle legislation.73 Under both, lawmakers would largely codify
the existing federal policy on autonomous vehicles. The SELF DRIVE Act,
which already passed in the House of Representatives, gives NHTSA 1 year to
issue a “rule-making and safety priority plan” outlining, “as necessary,” any
technology-specific amendments and additions to the FMVSS.74 The AV
START Act, currently pending in the Senate, would require one-time
recommendations within 5 years from a “Highly Automated Vehicles Technical
Committee,” after which NHTSA would have 1 year to consider and promulgate
any technology-specific amendments or additions to the FMVSS.75 In the interim,
both proposals would allow vehicle testing to move forward and authorize
NHTSA to grant manufacturers at least 80,000 exemptions from existing
FMVSS.76 The bills would also require manufacturers to submit some version of
the “Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment” described in NHTSA’s 2017 policy
statement, though prohibit any adverse action based thereupon.77 Notably, neither
risk of accidents” or “unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident”); 49 U.S.C. §
30118(b) (requiring a recall if NHTSA identifies a “defect related to motor vehicle safety”).
71
NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,707 (citing United States v. Chrysler
Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Notably, NHTSA’s recall authority does not
authorize it to order immediate mitigation measures by the manufacturer. See 49 U.S.C. §§
30118, 30120 (describing the recall authority).
72
See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 20 (explaining that NHTSA is authorized to
“enforc[e] compliance with FMVSSs” and oversee the “recall and remedy of . . . safety-related
vehicle defects” for autonomous vehicles); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 48 (stating that
NHTSA will treat autonomous vehicles like conventional vehicles and “pursue[] enforcement
actions when the Agency finds either a non-compliance [with FMVSS] or a defect posing an
unreasonable risk to safety”); NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,708 (same).
73
See SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (2017) (regulating “the safety of highly
automated vehicles”); AV START Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017) (supporting “the
development of highly automated vehicle safety technologies”). For a side-by-side comparison
of the two pieces of legislation, see Section-by-Section Comparison of House and Senate
Autonomous Vehicle Bills, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.enotrans.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/AV-Bill-SBS-Senate-Reported.pdf?x43122.
74
H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017).
75
S. 1885, 115th Cong. §§ 10(d)(3), 11(b) (2017). The bill would require a more expedient
review and resolution of any conflicts between existing FMVSS and autonomous vehicle
technologies. See id. § 4.
76
See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 6 (2017) (providing for up to 100,000 exemptions); S. 1885,
115th Cong. § 6 (2017) (providing for up to 80,000 exemptions).
77
See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017) (directing NHTSA to promulgate a rule requiring
submission of “safety assessment certifications” and, in the interim, mandating submission
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law would change the process by which the agency establishes or revises its rules
governing vehicle design and performance. NHTSA’s recall authority would also
remain untouched. Although increasing the number of exemptions could make
the system more flexible, FMVSS exemptions operate on a case-by-case basis.
2. State Regulation
Most states have also taken a hands-off approach to regulating the safety
and operation of autonomous vehicles. Although 35 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted legislation or issued an executive order related to
autonomous vehicles,78 many of these laws simply call for the study of
autonomous vehicles,79 establish advisory committees,80 or consider narrow
applications of automated technology.81 Only a fraction of the enacted state laws
impose specific regulatory mandates,82 instruct state agencies to promulgate
of the Safety Self-Assessment contemplated by the agency’s 2017 policy statement); S. 1885,
115th Cong. § 9 (2017) (requiring a “safety evaluation report” and describing its content).
78
See NCSL List, supra note 54 (listing proposed and enacted autonomous vehicle laws by state).
79
See H.R. 1065, 64th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2015) (commissioning a study about the benefits of
automated motor vehicles and requesting recommendations for policy changes); Exec. Order No.
18-04 (Minn. 2018) (establishing an “Advisory Council” to “study, assess, and prepare for the
transformation and opportunities associated with the widespread adoption of automated and
connected vehicles” and “develop recommendations for changes in state law, rules, and policies”).
80
See H.B. 4063, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018) (establishing a task force on
autonomous vehicles); H. 494, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2017) (convening a meeting of
automated vehicle experts); Exec. Order No. 2018-01 (Idaho 2018) (creating the
“Autonomous and Connected Vehicle Testing and Deployment Committee”); Exec. Order
245 (Wis. 2018) (forming the “Steering Committee on Autonomous and Connected Vehicle
testing and Deployment” to review current laws and identify areas for improvement).
81
See, e.g., S.B. 125, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2018) (addressing the platooning of
autonomous trucks); H.B. 1290, 120th Gen Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018) (same); S.B.
116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (same); H.B. 1343, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018)
(same); H.B. 1754, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (same); H. 3289, 122d Gen.
Assemb. (S.C. 2017) (same); H.B. 373, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (same).
82
See A.B. 9508, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (requiring, for example, “that a natural
person holding a valid license for the operation of the motor vehicle's class be present within such
vehicle for the duration of the time it is operated on public highways”); Exec. Order No. 201804K (Ohio 2018) (requiring, for example, “a designated operator” for all autonomous vehicles in
the state); S.B. 260, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017) (requiring, for example, that any
autonomous test vehicle be operated by a person “seated in the driver’s seat” and “capable of
taking immediate manual control”); Council 19-643, Council Period 20 (D.C. 2013) (mandating
that autonomous vehicles comply with traffic laws, possess a manual override feature, and have
a driver present); Exec. Order No. 17-02 (Wash. 2017) (outlining different requirements for
autonomous vehicles based on whether or not human operators are present); Exec. Order No. 572
(Mass. 2016) (requiring, for example, that autonomous test vehicles have “a human being . . . in
the driver’s seat”); see also A.B. 69, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (allowing for the operation
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such mandates,83 or expressly authorize autonomous vehicle operation.84
These laws, at least as they pertain to vehicle design and operation, can be
divided into roughly three categories: (1) laws which mandate specific design
features and limit the operation of autonomous vehicles,85 (2) laws which limit
the operation of autonomous vehicles but do not mandate specific design
features,86 and (3) laws which expressly authorize the operation of autonomous
vehicles with varying degrees of oversight.87 Notably, as at the federal level,
of fully autonomous vehicles, but imposing strict design requirements on partially automated
vehicles). Some of the laws regarding autonomous truck platoons, listed supra note 81, also
include specific regulatory mandates. See, e.g., S.B. 116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (“An
appropriately endorsed driver who holds a valid commercial driver's license shall be present
behind the wheel of each commercial motor vehicle in a platoon.”).
83
See H.P. 1204, 128th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2018) (instructing the Commissioner of
Transportation to promulgate rules governing autonomous vehicle testing and empowering her
to prohibit any testing which she deems a threat to public safety); Exec. Order No. 572 (Mass.
2016) (instructing the Department of Transportation to “issue guidance” to allow for the safe
testing of automated vehicles). Some of the laws regarding autonomous truck platoons, listed
supra note 81, also delegate regulatory authority. See, e.g., S.B. 116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2018) (directing the Kentucky Department of Vehicle Regulation to “promulgate
administrative regulations . . . set[ting] forth procedures for platooning, including required
elements of a platooning plan”).
84
See L.B. 989, 105th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2018) (authorizing cities to conduct pilot
projects to test autonomous vehicles); S.B. 2205, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (“A
political subdivision of this state or a state agency may not impose a . . . regulation related to
the operation of an automated motor vehicle or automated driving system.”); S.B. 17-213,
71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (authorizing persons to use “automated
driving system[s]”); S.B. 219, 154th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017) (allowing
persons to “operate a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged
without a human driver being present in the vehicle”); H.B. 791, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 2017) (forbidding local governments from “prohibiting the use of Automated
Driving System equipped vehicles”); S.B. 995, 98th Leg. (Mich. 2016) (allowing operation
of autonomous vehicles without a human driver present); S.B. 0598, 109th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015) (same); H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (“A person
who possesses a valid driver license may operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous
mode.”); Exec. Order No. 2018-04 (Ariz. 2018) (allowing “operation of self-driving vehicles
. . . with, or without, a person present”); H.B. 469, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017)
(authorizing “the operation of fully autonomous motor vehicles” by persons without a
driver’s license).
85
See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this first category of
laws, including those from Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Nevada, and the District
of Columbia).
86
See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this second category
of laws, including those from Maine, Washington, and Ohio).
87
See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this third category of
laws, including those from California, Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas,
Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Tennessee).
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no state has altered the way in which it approaches motor vehicle regulation,
leaving the processes by which state legislatures and agencies establish and
revise the rules governing autonomous vehicles unchanged from those
applicable to traditional vehicles.
The first category of laws includes Connecticut, New York,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and the District of Columbia. Although the testing of
autonomous vehicles is permitted in each locality, all but Nevada mandate that
a licensed human driver be present and capable of taking manual control of an
autonomous vehicle at all times.88 This mandate effectively requires that every
autonomous vehicle be equipped with a steering wheel, accelerator, and brake
pedal.89 Nevada permits the unrestricted testing and deployment of fully
autonomous vehicles without a human driver, but requires that all other
automated vehicle designs contain an “accessible” means to “engage and
disengage the automated driving system,” an indicator of whether the
automated driving system is engaged, and a system to alert the human operator
if “a failure of the automated driving system occurs.”90 Connecticut, New
York, and Massachusetts further limit who may test an autonomous vehicle91
and under what circumstances.92
88

See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(d)(1) (requiring that a human operator “be seated in the
driver’s seat” and “capable of taking immediate manual control”); D.C. CODE § 50-2352(2)
(requiring that a human driver be “seated in the control seat of the vehicle while in operation
[and be] prepared to take control of the autonomous vehicle at any moment”); A.B. 9508,
part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring that a “natural person . .
. be present within [the] vehicle for the duration of the time it is operated on public
highways”); Exec. Order No. 572 § 4 (Mass. 2016) (requiring a “human being” be seated in
“the driver’s seat or other location in the vehicle” where she “can take immediate control of
the vehicle if necessary”).
89
These design features are explicitly required under D.C. law and implicitly required under
Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts law.
90
NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.080(2)(a)–(b).
91
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(d)(1)(D) (limiting vehicle operators to an “employee,
independent contractor or other person designated and trained by the autonomous vehicle
tester”);A.B. 9508, part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring vehicle
operators to hold a valid driver’s license); Exec. Order No. 572 § 2 (Mass. 2016) (limiting
testing of autonomous vehicles to “companies in the [autonomous vehicle] sector”). Until
recently, the District of Columbia also limited who could test autonomous vehicles. See D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 114 (repealed 2018) (limiting vehicle operators to those who hold a
special autonomous vehicle license).
92
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(c) (restricting testing to agreed upon “locations and
routes”); A.B. 9508, part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring
“demonstrations and tests shall only take place . . . in a form and manner prescribed by the
superintendent of the New York state police”); Exec. Order No. 572 § 4 (Mass. 2016)
(requiring a demonstration that the vehicle can be “operated without undue risk to public
safety”).
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The second category of laws is limited to Maine, Washington, and
Ohio. Maine restricts autonomous vehicle operation to “pilot projects” preapproved by a Highly Automated Vehicles Advisory Committee.93 The
duration of each project is limited and approval contingent on a cost-benefit
analysis conducted by the Advisory Committee.94 Similarly, an executive order
issued by Governor John Kasich of Ohio limits autonomous vehicle operation
to “testing and pilot programs” and requires registration with the Department
of Transportation prior to operation.95 The state also requires that companies
submit a safety self-evaluation and designate “an employee, contractor, or
agent” to “actively monitor the [autonomous] vehicle at all times.”96 Finally,
Washington permits the operation of autonomous vehicles which are “capable”
of complying with “relevant” state motor vehicle laws, but only as part of a
“pilot program” and by “entities that that are developing autonomous vehicle
technology equipment.”97
The final category of laws includes California, Colorado, Georgia,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Tennessee.
In all ten states, the testing and deployment of fully autonomous vehicles is
expressly permitted and members of the public may operate or facilitate the
operation of an automated vehicle.98 Tennessee, Colorado, North Carolina, and
93

Exec. Order No. 2018–001 at 3 (Me. 2018).
See id. (instructing the committee to “assess the purpose(s) of proposed Pilot Projects,
including their benefits for the traveling public and their value for the advancement of HAV
technologies in the State of Maine” and to weigh these factors against “public safety”).
95
Exec. Order No. 2018–04K §§ 1, 3 (Ohio 2018).
96
Id. §§ 5–6.
97
Exec. Order No. 17–02 at 2–3 (Wash. 2017).
98
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (“A person may use an automated driving
system to drive a motor vehicle or to control a function of a motor vehicle . . . .”); FLA. STAT.
§ 316.85 (2018) (“A person who possesses a valid driver license may operate an autonomous
vehicle in autonomous mode on roads in this state if the vehicle is equipped with autonomous
technology . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a) (2018) (“A person may operate a fully
autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged without a human driver
being present in the vehicle . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(3)(a) (2018) (permitting
a “motor vehicle manufacturer” to make available on-demand autonomous motor vehicles
for members of the public); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60–3302 (2018) (“A driverless-capable
vehicle may operate on the public roads of this state without a conventional human driver
physically present in the vehicle . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(h) (2018) (“A person
may operate a fully autonomous vehicle . . . .”);TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55–30–103 (2018)
(“An ADS-operated vehicle may drive or operate on streets and highways in this state with
the ADS engaged without a human driver physically present in the vehicle . . . .”); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE § 545.454 (a) (2017) (“An automated motor vehicle may operate in this state
with the automated driving system engaged, regardless of whether a human operator is
physically present in the vehicle.”); Exec. Order No. 2018-04 § 3 (Ariz. 2018) (“Testing or
operation of vehicles on public roads . . . shall be allowed . . . .”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13,
94
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Texas even prohibit cities and municipalities from banning or limiting the use
of autonomous vehicles within their boundaries.99 All but Florida, Colorado,
Nebraska, and Texas require that vehicle owners notify state regulators prior
to operating on public roads,100 and all but Florida mandate that vehicles
comply with existing state and federal regulations.101 Interestingly, despite
§ 228.00 (2018) (allowing autonomous vehicles to be “deployed on public roads in
California”).
99
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-202(a) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42–4–110(b) (2018); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-401(i) (2018); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.452(b) (2017).
100
See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a)(5) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “registered”
and be “identified on such registration as a fully autonomous vehicle”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 257.665b(3)(a) (2018) (“The motor vehicle manufacturer may commence a SAVE project
at any time after it notifies the department that it has self-certified as provided in subsection
(1).”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(h)(5) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “registered”
and “identified on the registration and registration card as a fully autonomous vehicle”);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-30-103 (2018) (“In order for a manufacturer to participate in a
SAVE project, it must submit a letter to the department prior to operating any ADS-operated
vehicles on the public roads or highways.”); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2018–04 § 3 (requiring
that each owner of an autonomous vehicle, “prior to commencing testing or operation, . . .
submit[ ] a written statement to the Arizona Department of Transportation” self-certifying
compliance with the executive order); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.06(a) (2018) (“[A]n
autonomous vehicle shall not be deployed on any public road in California until the
manufacturer has submitted and the department has approved an Application for a Permit to
Deploy Autonomous Vehicles on Public Streets . . . .”).
101
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable of
complying with every state and federal law that applies to the function that the system is
operating”); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a)(1) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable
of being operated in compliance with [the rules of the road] and has been, at the time of its
manufacture, certified by the manufacturer as being in compliance with applicable federal
motor vehicle safety standards”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(1)(c)-(d) (2018) (requiring
that each vehicle comply “with all applicable state and federal laws” and be “capable of being
operated in compliance with applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state”); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-3303(2) (2018) (“The automated driving system feature, while engaged,
shall be designed to operate . . . in compliance with the Nebraska Rules of the Road . . . .”);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-30-103(1) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle comply with “all
applicable state and federal laws” and be “capable of being operated in compliance with
applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.454(b)(1),
(3) (2017) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable of operating in compliance with
applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state” and “equipped with an automated
driving system in compliance with applicable federal law and federal motor vehicle safety
standards”); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2018-04 § 3(a), (c) (requiring that each vehicle comply
with “all applicable federal law and federal motor vehicle safety standards,” as well as be
“capable of complying with all applicable [state] traffic and motor vehicle safety laws and
regulations”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.06(8)–(9) (2018) (“[T]he manufacturer shall
certify that the autonomous technology meets Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards [and]
. . . that the autonomous technology is designed to detect and respond to roadway situations
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mandating compliance with existing state laws, only Michigan, Colorado, and
Texas expressly clarify that autonomous vehicles are deemed to satisfy all
traffic and motor vehicle laws which reference the presence of a driver or
physical acts performed by a driver.102
II. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND
OTHER RAPIDLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES
Despite the potential economic, social, and environmental benefits
outlined in Part I, autonomous vehicles face a number of obstacles to
widespread commercial adoption. One of the most significant sources of
potential friction is the evolving legal and regulatory environment within
which autonomous vehicles must continue to develop and operate. Although
regulation can help to facilitate the commercial success of emerging
technologies, as well as manage potential risks, it also has potential
drawbacks.103 In discussing the ways in which the present and future
regulation of autonomous vehicles may impede their development, this Part
proceeds in two sections. In the first, I outline the inherent challenge of
regulating rapidly evolving technologies like autonomous vehicles and divide
common regulatory responses to this challenge into three categories. In doing
so, I draw on Part I of the article to highlight how all three responses are
reflected in both existing and proposed state and federal approaches to
regulating autonomous vehicles. In the second section, I then analyze the
potential barriers to commercial adoption of new technologies inherent in
in compliance with all provisions of the California Vehicle Code and local regulation
applicable to the performance of the dynamic driving task in the vehicle’s operational design
domain . . . .”).
102
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(4) (2018) (“When engaged, an automated driving
system or any remote or expert-controlled assist activity shall be considered the driver or
operator of the vehicle for purposes of determining conformance to any applicable traffic or
motor vehicle laws and shall be deemed to satisfy electronically all physical acts required by
a driver or operator of the vehicle.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (“Any
provision . . . that by its nature regulates a human driver . . . does not apply to an automated
driving system, except for laws regulating the physical driving of a vehicle.”); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-3306 (2018) (“[T]he Nebraska Rules of the Road shall not be construed as
requiring a conventional human driver to operate a driverless-capable vehicle that is being
operated by an automated driving system, and the automated driving system of such vehicle,
when engaged, shall be deemed to fulfill any physical acts required of a conventional human
driver to perform the dynamic driving task.”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.453(a)(1)–(2)
(2017) (clarifying that “the automated driving system is considered to be licensed to operate
the vehicle” and that “the owner of the automated driving system is considered the operator
of the automated motor vehicle solely for the purpose of assessing compliance with
applicable traffic or motor vehicle laws”).
103
See supra notes 11-13 (highlighting the potential benefits and drawbacks of regulation).
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each regulatory response and consider the ways in which employing each
type of approach could adversely impact autonomous vehicles.
A. The Pacing Problem and Potential Regulatory Responses to the Problem
One of the main challenges of regulating emerging technologies like
autonomous vehicles is the incongruous rates at which law and technology
sometimes evolve. The following section describes both the inherent obstacles
to adaptation of new and existing regulations to rapid technological change and
the way in which uncertainty and the inertia of U.S. legal institutions give rise to
three common regulatory responses: precaution, inaction, and proactivity.
1. Why U.S. Legal Institutions Struggle to Keep Up with New
Technologies
A growing body of literature explores the difficulties faced by regulatory
frameworks as they attempt to evolve concurrently with the technologies which
they target.104 This phenomenon, labeled by one commentator as the “pacing
problem,”105 captures the recurring tension between the limited reactive and
adaptive capacity of U.S. legal institutions and the increasingly fluid nature of
emerging technologies.106 At the heart of this tension are several characteristics
of traditional sources of regulation—legislatures, administrative agencies, and
courts—which can make it difficult, if not impossible, for the law to keep pace
with rapidly changing technologies.107
a. Legislatures
The limited reactive and adaptive capacity of U.S. legal institutions is
particularly pronounced in the legislative process. Legislatures are the most
104

See supra notes 4-6 (surveying this literature).
Marchant, supra note 15. Other scholars have described this same problem using different labels
and metaphors, but Professor Marchant’s account is the most recent and salient. See, e.g., ROGER
BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 160–61 (2008)
(defining the problem as one of “regulatory connection”); Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and
New Frontiers of Family Law, 1 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 196, 212 (1987) (describing the law as a tortoise
and technology as a hare). It also provides the jumping off point for this analysis.
106
See supra notes 4–5 (describing the accelerating rate of technological change and the
increasingly limited capacity of legal institutions to adapt and shape outcomes).
107
This is not to suggest that U.S. legal institutions can never and do not ever keep pace with
technological change; rather, it is meant to highlight the features of U.S. legal institutions which
can and frequently do create gaps. In addition, some commentators have suggested that the speed
at which technology is currently evolving is more rapid than at previous moments in history.
105
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powerful and fundamental lawmaking unit within the U.S. political system.
Congress and state legislatures possess a wide range of tools with which to
regulate new and emerging technologies, including the delegation of
regulatory authority to administrative bodies,108 the creation of specialized
courts,109 and the passage of new legislation.110 Nevertheless, despite these
inherent capabilities, the rate at which legislatures operate is constrained both
by design and political circumstance.
At the federal level, constitutional and statutory language impose a
number of structural and procedural requirements which deliberately “slow
legislative decision making and distance it from the immediacy of legislators’
and various constituencies’ passions and desires.”111 Article I of the U.S.
Constitution, for example, requires that proposed legislation be debated and
approved by both houses of Congress,112 after which any approved legislation
must be presented to the president for his signature or veto.113 As James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton outlined in The Federalist Papers, these
108

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (reaffirming congressional
power to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies if there is an “intelligible principle” upon
which an agency may base its actions); Separation of Powers—Delegation of Legislative
Power, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-statelegislatures/delegation-of-legislative-power.aspx [https://perma.cc/HYZ5-CHXF] (describing state approaches to legislative delegations of authority).
109
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the “judicial Power” of the United States shall
be “vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power to . . .
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court . . . .”); Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of
Specialized Courts, INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN., 1, 1, 7–13 (2009) (discussing specialized state
and federal courts).
110
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a Congress” and
enumerating its powers).
111
Eric Lane, Men Are Not Angels: The Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can
Do About It, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 579, 598-99 (1998); see also Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The
Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915,
1933 (2011) (“One of the important purposes of procedural rules such as bicameral passage,
discussion in committee, and three readings is precisely to slow down the legislative process
and to make legislation an arduous and deliberate process. These rules ensure, inter alia, that
laws will not change too frequently or too hastily . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV.
703, 771 (2002) (“[T]he Framers saw that bicameralism had the potential to reduce the
influence of excessive political passion and the power of special-interest groups, thereby
improving the quality of legislation.”).
112
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
113
Id.; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 111, at 715 (“The President’s veto power
has the effect of making the President a third legislative house, turning our system into one
of tricameralism.”).
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features of the lawmaking process are designed as a deliberate anchor against
precipitous change.114 In addition, internal rules of congressional procedure—
such as the requirement that proposed legislation be reviewed in committee115
and that all legislation be read three times prior to passage116—serve a similar
purpose.117 Many of these same structural and procedural constraints are
reflected in state legislative processes.118
In addition to the designed constraints on legislative efficiency, political
circumstance also places a check on the reactive and adaptive capacity of
legislatures. Congress and state legislatures are often faced with more issues than
time or resources allow them to address.119 As Professor John W. Kingdon
famously argued, policy issues are unlikely to receive attention outside of brief
“policy windows” when political feasibility, social urgency, and mature policy
solutions combine to allow for legislative action.120 Although the combination
of these factors permits new laws to be enacted or old laws to be adapted during
an open window, it may be years before political conditions allow lawmakers to
revisit the same issue during a new window.121 Moreover, the potential inability
of a single political party to control the presidency and both houses of Congress
simultaneously may create even larger gaps between these windows. There is
already anecdotal evidence to this effect, as the three most recent terms of
Congress, both characterized by significant political discord between and within
the legislative and executive branches, each produced fewer laws than any other
term since 1948, when congressional productivity was first measured.122
114

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“To
trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume.”).
115
See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XVII(3)(a); Rules of the House of Representatives,
R. XII(2)(a).
116
See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XIV(2); Rules of the House of Representatives, R.
XVI(8)(a)-(c).
117
See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 543, 552-57 (2007) (describing the “significant effect[]” internal rules of procedure
have on the pace of legislative action).
118
See, e.g., How a Bill Becomes Law: Michigan Legislature, MICH. LEGISLATIVE SERV.
BUREAU, http://www.legislature.mi.gov/publications/howbillbecomeslaw.pdf (last visited
March 3, 2017) (describing the procedural requirements for Michigan state laws, including
that each bill be read three times and reviewed in committee prior to becoming law).
119
See Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About
Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726 (2009) (“Congress is handcuffed by the
synergistic effect of an impossibly large number of important issues needing attention mixed with
partisan gridlock, making prompt action on any but the most urgent or symbolic issues unlikely.”).
120
See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984).
121
Id.
122
See Ezra Klein, Goodbye and Good Riddance, 112th Congress, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG
(Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/04/goodbye-and-good
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b. Administrative Agencies
Although administrative agencies ostensibly operate with greater
efficiency and flexibility than legislatures,123 they also face potential obstacles
to enacting or adjusting regulations in response to rapid technological change.
These obstacles can be divided into three categories. First, the authority
delegated to an agency by a legislature may be a poor fit for the task of regulating
an emerging technology where a technology or problem was unanticipated by
the legislature. An outdated organic statute could limit or delay an agency’s
regulatory response to certain aspects of a new technology or prevent an agency
from regulating the new technology altogether.124 In the field of biotechnology,
for example, commentators have observed that it is unclear whether any agency
has authority to regulate genetically modified animals containing genes from
other species and not intended for human consumption.125 As outlined in the
previous section, amendment of an agency’s statutory authority can be a slow
process, especially in a politically polarized climate.126
Second, if an agency does have the authority to regulate a new
technology, powerful stakeholders may nevertheless capture the agency and
attempt to prevent effective regulation.127 The problem of regulatory capture is
-riddance-112th-congress/ [https://perma.cc/WE25-6SQE] (noting that the 112th Congress
passed the fewest laws of “any Congress on record”); Statistics and Historical Comparison,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/2XR4-98V5] (last
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (listing the number of laws enacted by each session of Congress and
showing that the past three have enacted the fewest laws since tracking began in 1948). This trend
may change, however, after the most recent election, when Republicans took control of the presidency and both houses of Congress. This anomaly itself represents a potential policy window.
123
Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012) (allowing, on its face, for agencies to promulgate binding
rules after three easy steps: (1) notice, (2) comment, and (3) publication of “a concise general
statement of [a rule’s] basis and purpose”).
124
See Mandel, supra note 6, at 84 (“Statutes and regulations, almost by definition, are
designed to handle regulatory concerns existing at the time of promulgation. It is not
surprising that emerging technologies often exacerbate regulatory gaps or introduce new
concerns that create new regulatory lacunae.”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 505, 577 (providing examples).
125
Mandel, supra note 6, at 84–85; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience,
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and
Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2230-36 (2004) (discussing the gaps in federal
agencies’ authority to regulate genetically modified products).
126
See supra pp. 21–23.
127
See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); see also Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can
We Channel it Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176-88
(2011) (unpacking the different forms of capture).

Vol. 4:1]

Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation

107

well documented.128 In the context of emerging technologies, an incumbent
industry benefiting from an existing regulatory scheme or hoping to handicap a
new technology may use its clout to prevent an agency from effectively
regulating the new technology, or at least from doing so in a manner that
necessarily prioritizes the public interest.129 Similarly, powerful business
interests invested in developing new technologies, such as Google or Uber in the
case of autonomous vehicles, may attempt to prevent new regulations designed
to promote safety, but which impose significant costs or disadvantage specific
forms of a technology.
Finally, even if an agency has the ability and will to regulate a new
technology, the actual process of enacting or amending contested rules is often
slow. A typical federal rule takes one to two years from the time an agency issues
a notice of proposed rulemaking to the time it is published in the Federal
Register.130 Some agencies take longer.131 This is largely the result of
statutory,132 judicial,133 and executive branch-imposed134 procedural require128

See, e.g., John Abraham & Rachel Ballinger, Science, Politics, and Health in the Brave New
World of Pharmaceutical Carcinogenic Risk Assessment: Technical Progress or Cycle of
Regulatory Capture? 75 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1433, 1434 (examining capture in public health
regulation); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 105–109 (2011) (documenting capture in the
context of environmental regulations); Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking 4-6 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 34, 2006) (discussing capture within banking regulation).
129
See Whitt, supra note 5, at 553 (describing this problem in the context of efforts by the
Federal Communications Commission to regulate emerging communications technologies).
130
Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1414, 1456-58 (2012).
131
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1015 (1995) (finding
the EPA usually takes over three years to comply with all procedural requirements).
132
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (containing the procedural requirements applicable to the informal
rulemaking process); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (containing the procedural requirements
applicable to the less frequently used formal rulemaking process).
133
See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir.1991) (requiring that final
rules be a logical outgrowth of proposed rules); U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.
568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring that agencies disclose the “basic data relied
upon” and answer, as part of its concise general statement, all “vital questions” raised in
public comments). Since Vermont Yankee held that courts are “generally not free to impose
. . . additional procedural requirements” beyond those provided for in Section 553, the paper
hearing requirement and logical outgrowth test are both, ostensibly, interpretations of
requirements contained in Section 553. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
134
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring, among
other things, that “significant regulatory actions” undergo a cost-benefit review by the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs).

108

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Nov. 2018

ments. In addition, some argue that regulatory processes at the federal and state
level have slowed, or “ossified,” significantly over the past forty years.135 In the
U.S., regulatory agencies are required to undertake a number of analytical
requirements to support regulatory decisions. These requirements are imposed
by the legislative,136 judicial,137 and executive branches.138 Although a growing
body of empirical research challenges the ossification thesis,139 “[a]dministrative
law scholars appear almost universally to accept that pre-enforcement review of
regulations at NHTSA,” the federal agency responsible for regulating
autonomous vehicles, “has led to a decline in new regulations.”140
c. Courts
The adaptive and reactive capacity of U.S. courts is also limited.141
Three features help to account for this limited capacity. First, federal and state
135

See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (arguing that “[a]n assortment of analytical requirements . . .
imposed on the simple rulemaking model, and evolving judicial doctrines . . . [requiring] agencies
to take greater pains to ensure that the technical bases for rules are capable of withstanding judicial
scrutiny” have caused the rulemaking process to “become increasingly rigid and burdensome”);
see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 161 (1997) (“The past decade’s case study literature on the performance
of America's administrative agencies details an agency-by-agency retreat from rulemaking.”).
136
See supra note 132 (describing the procedural requirements applicable to formal and informal
rulemaking).
137
See supra note 133 (describing the paper hearing requirement and logical outgrowth test).
138
See supra note 134 (describing the cost-benefit review required of significant regulatory
actions).
139
See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 130, at 1445–63 (finding that “evidence that
ossification generally is either a serious or widespread problem is mixed at best, and appears
relatively weak overall”); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1125–31 (concluding that “regulatory agencies have not
abandoned their use of rulemaking”).
140
Coglianese, supra note 139, at 1126–27 (citing JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)); see also MASHAW, supra note 135; Robert
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and
Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 n.2 (1991); McGarity, supra note 135, at
1412 (noting how judicial review has hampered NHTSA’s willingness to promulgate new
rules); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 300, 311 (1988) (explaining that “NHTSA has abandoned almost completely its efforts
to establish policy through rulemaking”). But see Coglianese, supra note 139, at 1127–29
(questioning the empirical validity of such claims).
141
This is not to say that courts and judges are incapable of adapting to technological change.
Cf. Paul Martin & Patrick Schmidt, Courts During Periods of Rapid Technological Change:
Comparative Perspectives on Freedom of Speech in the Digital Era 29 (Aug. 28, 2003)
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courts are part of the common law tradition. In contrast to a civil law system,
which relies on a comprehensive set of codified rules to guide the reasoning
of judges, the common law system builds on prior judicial decisions in
analogous cases to supply legal rules.142 Despite creating predictability and
stability, the reliance on precedent and analogical reasoning places a check
on rapid change in the legal system.143 As one commentator notes, the
common law system is “grounded in the notion of slow, evolutionary
adaptation . . . in a case-by-case format.”144 Although there is room for judges
to adjust the law to new conditions by distinguishing or overruling
precedent,145 the process of revising existing legal doctrines or developing
new doctrines is slow and piecemeal.146 If one court–whether at the federal
or state level–decides to adjust the law in response to a new technology, there
is no guarantee that courts in other states or regions will do the same, and the
rate at which other courts react could vary throughout the country.
(unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association) (on file with author) (finding that courts, despite reoccurring challenges, may
find ways adapt to technological change, if only as a matter of necessity). The issue here,
however, is that the speed at which they do so can have potentially deleterious effects on the
development of a new technology.
142
See generally Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and Common Law: Some Points of
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419 (1967) (providing a comparative overview of the
common law and civil law systems). This is not to say that common law courts do not also
rely on statutes – they do. Id. at 425–27. But common law courts deal primarily with
precedent. Id. at 427.
143
See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 625–26 (2001) (“The system of
stare decisis . . . creates an explicitly path-dependent process in which later decisions rely
on, and are constrained by, earlier decisions.”).
144
Martin & Schmidt, supra note 141, at 14. But see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy,
Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1009 (1997) (“Counterintuitively, technological
change may . . . be more likely to lead to extensive . . . changes in the courts . . . .”).
145
See Dainow, supra note 142, at 425 (“[A] judge [can] ‘distinguish’ [a] previous decision
and leave its application limited to the specific fact situation which it control[s] . . . . The
latter two techniques, distinguishing and overruling, ma[k]e room for flexibility and permit[]
adjustment to new conditions.”); see also Hathaway, supra note 143, at 647 (“The law
evolves gradually over time, drawing on an existing stock of precedent, punctuated by
periods of rapid adaptation.”).
146
See Lyria Bennett Moses, Adapting the Law to Technological Change: A Comparison of
Common Law and Legislation, 26 U. NEW S. WHALES L.J. 394, 395 (2003) (noting that,
although the common law “constantly adapts to technological change,” it is “slow, piecemeal
and unable to reach an optimal solution to every problem on its own”). Moreover, fears about
legitimacy may prevent judges from moving too far afield of prior decisions. See Martin &
Schmidt, supra note 141, at 14.
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Second, when courts apply and interpret statutes, they are virtually
powerless to modify or discard outdated statutory rules.147 Where a statute is
poorly suited to a new technology or otherwise obsolete, only the legislature can
revise or repeal the rule. Although the various tools of statutory interpretation
allow judges some flexibility in applying existing law, courts are, at least as a
formal matter, powerless to adapt a statute to new technologies.148 These
limitations, combined with the slow pace of legislative change, has prompted
one prominent commentator, Guido Calabresi, to suggest that courts should
“treat statutory rules in the same way as they do common law rules, effectively
repealing them when they fail to achieve their purposes or no longer fit in the
legal landscape in light of changing conditions.”149
Finally, even when courts do attempt to adapt the law to technological
change, the civil litigation process can be slow and protracted.150 It can take years
for a single case to progress from the filing of a complaint at the trial level to a
final appellate decision.151 In recent years, civil cases filed in federal district
court have taken an average of thirty months, or two and a half years, to receive
final appellate action.152 This figure is only an average, and cases involving
multiple interested parties and complex new technologies may take even longer
to litigate given the importance of an outcome to the commercial success of a
147

See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the ways in which a statute might be outdated; cf.
also Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 247–69 (offering a typology
of the different ways in which statutory rules can become outdated).
148
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress); see also Robert
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 213, 217 (1983) (noting that “our jurisprudence treats the legislative command as a
uniquely imperative form of legal authority from which judges, at least presumptively, can
do no more than mechanically deduce right answers for specific cases”); Moses, supra note
146, 412 (arguing that statutory obsolesce is “unlikely to be solved by judicial interpretation”
and that only a legislature “can act to change [an outdated] rule”).
149
Moses, supra note 147, at 281 (paraphrasing the thesis put forth in GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)).
150
See generally Michael Heise, Justice Delayed: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case
Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834‒35 (2000) (conducting an empirical
analysis of the disposition time for civil cases that reach a jury trial in state court); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19
SEATTLE U. L. REV., 433, 434‒45 (1996) (comparing federal and state civil trials).
151
See Heise, supra note 150, at 834‒35 (finding that the mean civil case disposition time in
state court from filing to jury verdict is more than 30 months); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS tbl.B-4A (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b4a_09
30.2017.pdf (finding that the median civil case disposition time in federal court from filing
to final order on appeal is more than 30 months).
152
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 151, tbl.B4-A.
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new technology and the non-specialized nature of most state and federal courts.
The slow pace at which individual cases often advance through the court system
only serves to exacerbate the systemic and jurisdictional checks discussed above.
Indeed, when the developmental path of a technology is highly uncertain, as is
the case with autonomous vehicles, “a judicial opinion could be outdated before
it is even decided even at the time it is issued.”153
2. Potential Regulatory Responses to Uncertainty and
the Pacing Problem
The slow rate at which traditional regulatory institutions often
respond and adapt to technological change, as well as the perceived risks and
uncertainties of emerging technologies, gives rise to three common
regulatory responses. These responses—precaution, inaction, and
proactivity—reflect fundamentally different understandings of regulation’s
role in the emergence of novel technologies like autonomous vehicles. All
three responses, however, are implicitly informed by an underlying
uncertainty with respect to the ability of traditional legal institutions to
effectively react and adapt to rapid changes in technology. Although the
regulation of autonomous vehicles remains in a nascent stage, features of all
three responses are discernable in the current regulation at the state and
federal level, and are likely to inform future regulation.
a. Attempt to Slow Technological Development
The most conservative regulatory response to rapid technological
change is to slow the development of a new technology. This approach, often
referred to as the “precautionary principle,” is commonly reduced to the
phrase “better safe than sorry.”154 The precautionary principle operates on the
153

Marchant, supra note 15, at 24.
Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An American Assessment from
an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 (2006). There is no single
manifestation of the precautionary principle and not every manifestation requires completely
halting the development of a technology. See generally Per Sandin, Dimensions of the
Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889 (1999) (arguing that
there are several different formulations of the precautionary principle). The basic premise of the
principle, however, remains consistent across these different manifestations. Moreover, although
the precautionary principle first emerged in the context of environmental regulation, it has since
been applied in a number of other contexts. See Chang-fa Lo, Risks, Scientific Uncertainty and
the Approach of Applying Precautionary Principle, 28 J. MED. & L. 283, 289 (2009) (noting that
the precautionary principle has also been applied to “genetically modified organisms (‘GMOS’),
human rights, planetary defense, terrorist attacks, and tourism”).
154
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assumption that it is best to limit or halt the commercial adoption of an
emerging technology until it is explicitly shown to be safe or sufficient
information exists to calibrate a proportionate regulatory response.155 As one
commentator notes, this approach “seeks to create a ‘speed bump’ that can
slow the pace of rapidly developing technologies whose risks are uncertain
and regulatory frameworks incomplete.”156 In particular, by restraining the
rate at which a new technology can take root and evolve, proponents believe
that the precautionary principle provides regulators with additional time and
information to design and enact regulatory frameworks, as well as reduces
the likelihood that such frameworks will need to be amended based on new
information regarding the risks or trajectory of an emerging technology.157
Although rarely framed as a direct response to the pacing problem,
application of the precautionary principle is a common regulatory reaction to the
scientific and developmental uncertainty which accompanies many new
technologies.158 In U.S. domestic law, the precautionary principle is reflected in
both environmental and health regulations.159 The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, for example, requires pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate
the efficacy and safety of new drugs and medical devices before they can enter
155

Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 337
(2017) (“At its heart, the precautionary principle tells us that it is better to be safe than sorry in the
face of significant risk of irreversible harm, even if we are uncertain about the magnitude of the risk.”).
156
Gary E. Marchant, Addressing the Pacing Problem, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 200 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011).
157
See Light, supra note 155, at 363 (arguing that the precautionary principle serves an
information forcing function); cf. also Han Somsen, Cloning Trojan Horses: Precautionary
Regulation of Reproductive Technology, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES,
REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 228–29 (Roger Brownsword & Karen
Yeung eds., 2008) (observing that the precautionary principle is “not so much a principle
that urges regulators to stray on the side of caution . . . , as a procedural principle that instructs
[regulators] to take account of all relevant knowledge in circumstances of scientific
uncertainty and ignorance”).
158
See James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE
MILLENNIUM 250 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 1999) (“[N]o country
has so fully adopted the essence of the precautionary principle in domestic law as the United
States.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15
(2005) (observing that the precautionary principle “enjoys widespread international support”
and “has been a staple of regulatory policy for several decades”); Wood et al., supra note
154, at 585 (“[T]he regulatory policies embodied in the precautionary principle . . . have
played, play and will continue to play a significant role in American law.”).
159
See generally DIAHANNA LYNCH & DAVID VOGEL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE
REGULATION OF GMOS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CASE-STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN REGULATORY POLITICS (2001), http://www.cfr.org/agricultural-policy/regulat
ion-gmos-europe-united-states-case-study-contemporary-european-regulatory-politics/p8688
(discussing the precautionary principle in U.S. law).
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the market.160 Similarly, the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to apply “an adequate margin of safety” in setting
emission limits for hazardous pollutants.161 European law also draws heavily on
the precautionary principle to address legal and scientific uncertainty.162 In
response to the emergence of genetically modified foods, for instance, the
European Commission has permitted only certain varieties to enter Europe and
requires labeling for those which are on the market.163
In the context of autonomous vehicles, some states have already
responded to the emergence of driverless technology by attempting to slow its
development. As discussed in Part I, several states require that a human driver
be present in an autonomous vehicle during operation and effectively require that
all autonomous vehicles feature a steering wheel, brake pedal, and accelerator.164
Similarly, other states only allow the operation of autonomous vehicles for
testing purposes and prohibit or limit commercial applications.165 Although no
longer federal policy, NHTSA previously urged states to both prohibit the
“operation of autonomous vehicles for purposes other than testing” and require
that a human driver be present and capable of taking control over an autonomous
vehicle.166 These laws, in essentially slowing the development of autonomous
vehicles by mandating technically unnecessary features or simply limiting their
operation, attempt to render autonomous vehicle technology a stationary target
more amenable to the limited reactive and adaptive capabilities of regulatory
institutions. That is, rather than accelerating the rate at which the institutions
overseeing autonomous vehicles operate, laws in some states are slowing or
manipulating the rate at which autonomous vehicle technology can be adopted
so that regulatory institutions have an opportunity to keep pace.
160

See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (requiring pre-market approval of new medical devices based on a
showing that the device is “safe and effective”); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (same for new drugs).
161
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
162
See LYNCH & VOGEL, supra note 159, at 22 (observing that the precautionary principle
“has become increasingly influential in Europe”).
163
See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 735 (2003) (“[T]he European Commission has
taken a precautionary approach toward [genetically modified foods], and has permitted only
limited varieties of GM species to be introduced in Europe.”).
164
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (listing these states). In its 2016 policy
statement, NHTSA also proposed a “pre-market approval” system, wherein the agency would
have prohibited “the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offer for sale and sale” of
autonomous vehicles without agency approval based on “the safety of [a] vehicle’s performance.”
NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 72. The agency subsequently abandoned that proposal in
its 2017 policy statement.
165
See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (listing and describing the laws in these states).
166
NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 10.
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b. Avoid Amending Existing Regulations or Enacting
New Regulations
A second response to rapid technological change is to limit or refrain
from regulating a new technology.167 This approach, labeled “permissionless
innovation” by one commentator,168 views regulation as a potential
impediment to the development of emerging technologies.169 It maintains that
because regulatory institutions struggle to reverse or even revise prior
actions, regulators should refrain from acting until market failures demand
intervention or conclusive proof exists that a technology causes harm.170 In
contrast to the precautionary principle, permissionless innovation places its
faith in market forces and existing legal frameworks to maximize the success
and safety of new technologies.171 Although new regulations or adjustments
may sometimes be warranted,172 proponents of the approach assume that
attempting to regulate through lethargic or otherwise flawed legal institutions
167

Cf. Michael Kirby, New Frontier: Regulating Technology by Law and ‘Code’, in
REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 375 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (“[A] failure to
provide law to deal with . . . [new] technologies is not socially neutral. Effectively, to do
nothing is often to make a decision.”).
168
ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1 (2016), http://permissionlessinnovation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Thierer_Permissionless_web.pdf.
169
See generally id. at 8–12 (summarizing this approach); see also Adam Thierer,
Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 309, 352–56 (2013) (describing further the
premises on which this approach rests).
170
See KENNETH A. OYE ET AL., ON BELIEFS AND REGIMES: JUSTIFICATION, CAUSAL
KNOWLEDGE, AND MEASURES OF COMPLIANCE 15 (2005) (discussing the range of work
which challenges the precautionary principle and describing this work’s general presumption
that “[r]egulators should not act until after there is conclusive proof of harms, because
regulatory actions are often irreversible”).
171
See, e.g., Marc Scribner, Self-Driving Regulation: Pro-Market Policies Key to Automated
Vehicle Innovation 1 (Competitive Enter. Inst. Working Paper No. 192, 2014), https://cei.org
/sites/default/files/Marc%20Scribner%20-%20Self-Driving%20Regulation.pdf (“[R]egulatory
and legislative intervention . . . poses great risks to the development of [new] technolog[ies]. . . .
[L]aws and regulations that narrow the scope of permissible development, testing, and operational
functionality risk locking in inferior technology, delaying adoption, and increasing prices faced
by consumers.”).
172
See, e.g., Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles
and Driverless Cars 13 (Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/Thierer-Intelligent-Vehicles.pdf (“To the extent that more serious problems
develop or persist, public policy can always be adjusted to address those issues after careful
evaluation of the costs and benefits of proposed rules.”).
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will impose greater costs than benefits.173 As one commentator argues,
“[u]nless a compelling case can be made that an invention poses a serious
immediate threat to public well-being, innovation should be allowed to
continue unabated.”174
This combination of inaction and legalization is frequently proposed
as a response to rapid technological change.175 A good example is early
efforts to regulate the Internet.176 In his 1997 Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce, for instance, President Clinton articulated a largely
hands-off approach to regulating Internet technologies.177 His skepticism of
regulatory intervention was based in large part on concerns about the
incongruous rates at which the Internet and regulatory systems could
develop.178As the President warned, since “[b]usiness models must evolve
rapidly to keep pace with the break-neck speed of [technological change],
government attempts to regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they
are finally enacted, especially to the extent such regulations are technologyspecific.”179 Thus, instead of attempting to slow or otherwise manage the
development of information technology, President Clinton recommended
173

See, e.g., Daniel Sarewitz, Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies, in THE
GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 98 (Gary
E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he alignment of technological innovation with the ideologies
of the marketplace . . . tell us that the appropriate measures of technological value are monetary[
] and [that] the appropriate mode of intervention is hands-off.”); cf. JOEL MOKYR, LEVER OF
RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 16 (1990) (“Technological
progress is like a fragile and vulnerable plant, whose flourishing is not only dependent on the
appropriate surroundings and climate, but whose life is almost always short. It is highly sensitive
. . . and can easily be arrested by relatively small external changes.”).
174
Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 172, at 10.
175
See Demissie, Taming Matter for the Welfare of Humanity: Regulating Nanotechnology,
in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND
TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 340 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (noting the
popularity of this approach and describing it as “regulatory vogue”); Gregory N. Mandel,
History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
551, 564 (2007) (“[T]here often appears to be an inclination to handle new technology
disputes under existing rules.”); Lin, supra note 6, at 380 (observing that many “new
technologies . . . develop and come to market with little or no government oversight”).
176
See THIERER, supra note 168, at 14–15 (arguing that the Clinton administration’s “marketoriented vision for cyberspace governance” is a prototypical example of permissionless
innovation).
177
See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
(July 1, 1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (describing a “nonregulatory, market-oriented approach”)
178
See id. (cautioning that the Internet’s “explosive” growth could pose “significant logistical
and technological challenges” to regulators).
179
Id.
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that states and federal agencies “refrain from imposing new and unnecessary
regulations . . . on commercial activities that take place via the Internet.”180
Inaction and simple legalization have also been the most common
regulatory responses to autonomous vehicle technology. As described in Part I,
most states have refrained from prohibiting or strictly controlling the
development and operation of autonomous vehicles.181 Since the operation of
autonomous vehicles is generally presumed to be legal in every state without an
explicit prohibition, most states have effectively—if not formally—legalized
their operation.182 The federal government, moreover, acting through NHTSA,
has carefully limited its regulatory activities.183 Although the agency has
published non-binding best practices for industry participants184 and is currently
considering ways to remove barriers to autonomous vehicle technologies in
existing FMVSS,185 it has mostly remained a passive observer.186 This paucity
of state and federal action is no accident and, in some cases, is framed as a direct
response to the pacing problem.187 As autonomous vehicle developers, scholars,
180

Id.
See supra Part I.B.2 (surveying state laws).
182
See Smith, supra note 7 (explaining this presumption); see also Thad Moore, As SelfDriving Cars Come to More States, Regulators Take a Back Seat, WASH. POST (Aug. 29,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/as-self-driving-cars-come-tomore-states-regulators-take-a-back-seat/2015/08/28/7a29413e-474f-11e5-8ab4-c73967a14
3d3_story.html [https://perma.cc/L8MB-FJ5K] (reporting that, based on the strength of this
presumption, manufacturers have been taking prototypes on cross-country trips through
states without autonomous vehicle laws).
183
See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the federal response to autonomous vehicles); see also
Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 58, at 105 (“[T]he U.S. federal government has not
attempted to regulate autonomous motor vehicles as such . . . .”); RAND REPORT, supra note
8, at 103 (“There are currently no federal regulations related specifically to [autonomous
vehicle] technologies.”).
184
NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 1-18; NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 11–
36.
185
See Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with Automated Driving Systems, 83
Fed. Reg. 2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (seeking public comment on “regulatory barriers in the
existing [FMVSS]”).
186
Although the two bills currently pending in Congress, H.R. 3388 and S. 1885, encourage
NHTSA to consider creating some technology-specific regulations, they would mostly
codify the agency’s existing hands-off approach and leave in place the legal framework
governing conventional vehicles. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the main components of
both bills).
187
See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii, 1 (“The Federal Government wants
to ensure it does not impede progress with unnecessary or unintended barriers to innovation.
. . . As automated driving technologies evolve at a rapid pace, . . . [e]ach entity is free to be
creative and innovative when developing the best method for its system to appropriately
mitigate the safety risks associated with their approach.”); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note
181

Vol. 4:1]

Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation

117

and lawmakers continue to raise concerns about whether existing regulatory
machinery can keep pace with autonomous vehicle technology, inaction and
simple legalization are likely to remain popular responses.
c. Attempt to Regulate into the Future
A third response to rapid technological change is to enact future-facing
regulations that attempt to anticipate or otherwise shape the development of
an emerging technology. Proponents of this response acknowledge the
limitations of regulatory institutions but view regulation as an important
element in the success and safety of new innovations.188 They maintain that,
because regulatory institutions struggle to react and adapt to rapid changes in
emerging technologies, regulators must design frameworks which anticipate,
or attempt to guide, their ongoing and future development.189 In particular, the
approach assumes that regulators must minimize the probability that
regulations enacted in response to a new technology will need to be revised or
revisited in the future.190 Although there is no uniform theory of how to avoid
such revisions, the two most prominent approaches are to (1) mandate specific
characteristics or forms of a technology191 and (2) draft technology-neutral
13, at 10 (“Because . . . the technical specifications for . . . automated systems are still in
flux, the agency believes that regulation of the technical performance of automated vehicles
is premature at this time.”); see also Moore, supra note 182 (discussing the lack of
autonomous vehicle legislation and its relationship to many state lawmakers’ concerns about
stifling autonomous vehicle technology as it continues to evolve).
188
See, e.g., Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 111, 129‒30 (2018) (proposing a technology-neutral standard for regulating
algorithms so as to avoid “the need to constantly update laws and regulations” and arguing
that appropriate regulation “could have a positive effect on innovation[,] . . . create proper
incentives for the efficient use of humans and algorithms, and . . . allow victims of harm
caused by algorithms to stand on equal ground in terms of recovery”).
189
See Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1521
(2016) (“To avoid being made obsolete by technological changes, a law needs to anticipate
innovations; it can do so through prescience or . . . provisions that enable flexible application.”);
Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 24,
38–39 (2013) (“Given that the law cannot anticipate new technologies in detail, and once we
acknowledge that technology does develop and change faster than the pace of the legislative
process, the preference for a law that will last for longer than the present moment is clear.”).
190
See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1359 (2001) (describing the need to establish
“effective and enduring” regulations); see also S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 36 (1992) (designing
copyright rules to spare “Congress from having to revisit this issue almost annually in order
to keep pace with the rapidly changing technological world”).
191
See Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1523 (identifying this as one of the two forms of futurefacing regulations); Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 131
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laws which focus on achieving a particular state of the world rather than a
particular state of a technology.192
A future-facing approach to the regulation of emerging technologies
is perhaps the most natural and deliberate response to the pacing problem. As
such, regulators have operationalized this principle in a wide range of
technological contexts over the past forty years.193 In an attempt to “futureproof” copyright law, for example, Congress enacted a technology-neutral
regulatory framework in 1976.194 Whereas earlier frameworks conditioned
the protection of original works on the form or medium in which they were
fixed, the Copyright Act of 1976 extended protection to works “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”195 In making this change, lawmakers sought
to uncouple “the scope of an author’s rights” from specific technologies and
eliminate the need for future revisions based on “unknown and unforeseen
technologies.”196 Instead of “forc[ing] the law to struggle” with rapid changes
or requiring regular updates to copyright law, lawmakers aimed to craft a
framework “adaptable to technological advances.”197
(2015) (same); cf. Jaegul Lee et al., Innovation and Technology Policy: Lessons from Emission
Control and Safety Technologies in the U.S. Automobile Industry 7-8 (April 2007) (working
paper prepared for the Sloan Industry Studies Conference) (reviewing the use of technology
forcing regulations mandating adoption of “specific technologies or technological pathways”).
192
See Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1512–13 (“Rather than force the law to struggle with new
technologies, and in the interest of sparing legislators the time-consuming effort of frequent
revisions, technology neutrality attempts to avoid ossification by making a statute more adaptable
to technological advances.”); Geist, supra note 190, at 1359 (“Technology neutral . . . refers to
statutory tests or guidelines that do not depend upon a specific development or state of technology,
but rather are based on core principles that can be adapted to changing technologies.”).
193
See, e.g., Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 117 (2012) (proposing a technology-neutral “legislative model for
law enforcement access standards and downstream privacy protections for location
information”); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1015–17 (2010) (positing that courts have applied the Fourth
Amendment in a technology-neutral manner); Geist, supra note 190, at 1345–46 (recommending
a technology-neutral jurisdictional test for cases involving predominantly Internet-based
contacts); Nicholas W. Allard & Theresa Lauerhass, Debalkanize the Telecommunications
Marketplace, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 231 (1992) (examining the need for a technology-neutral
implementation of telecommunications policies).
194
Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1517; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–533, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified at scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code).
195
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
196
Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1517 n.93 (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (Comm. Print 1965)).
197
Id. at 1513.
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Despite its intuitive appeal, states have largely avoided future-facing
regulations in the autonomous vehicle context. The vast majority of states
make no attempt to shape or anticipate the development of autonomous
vehicle technology, limiting themselves to logistical management of product
testing or affirmative declarations that autonomous vehicles are legal under
existing law.198 The federal government, by contrast, has relied at least in part
on NHTSA’s technology-neutral recall authority as it seeks to avoid more
prescriptive actions.199 As discussed in Part I, that recall authority, as applied
to vehicle and equipment defects, allows the agency to order a recall if it finds
an “unreasonable risk to safety.”200 The “unreasonable risk” standard is part
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a law originally
enacted in 1966, but it remains central to the work of federal regulators.201
Although NHTSA’s policy has been to refrain from mandating the use or
design of specific autonomous vehicle technologies, and it has yet to order
any recalls, the agency appears confident that it can ensure autonomous
vehicle safety based predominantly on this technology-neutral authority and
without taking prescriptive actions in the future.202
B. Obstacles Created by Regulatory Responses to the Pacing Problem
The preceding section outlined the inherent challenge of regulating
rapidly evolving technologies like autonomous vehicles and described three
categories of common regulatory responses to this challenge. Although the aim
198

See supra Part I.B.2 (noting the presumption that autonomous vehicles are legal and
explaining that very few states address specific aspects of autonomous vehicle design).
Although state laws requiring a steering wheel, brake pedal, and accelerator could be viewed
as attempts to shape the development of autonomous vehicle technology, their motivation
appears to be more in line with the precautionary principle.
199
See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the current federal policy on autonomous vehicles).
200
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (detailing NHTSA’s recall authority)
201
See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S
REGULATORY TOOLS 2–4 (2016), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/
understanding_nhtsas_current_regulatory_tools-tag.pdf (providing an overview of the regulatory
tools, including determinations and remediations of unreasonable risks to safety, available to
NHTSA under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act).
202
NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 3 (“NHTSA has broad enforcement authority to
address existing and new automotive technologies and equipment. . . . Specifically,
NHTSA’s enforcement authority concerning safety-related defects in motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment extends and applies equally to current and emerging ADSs.”);
NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65, 708 (“NHTSA’s enforcement authority
concerning safety-related defects in motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment extends
and applies equally to current and emerging automated safety technologies. This includes
fully automated (self-driving) vehicles.”).
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of all three responses is to overcome the inertia of regulatory institutions and
facilitate the safe and widespread adoption of beneficial new technologies, each
has potential drawbacks. As lawmakers, scholars, and market participants
consider how to realize the benefits of autonomous vehicles, it is not only
important to identify the inherent limitations of existing regulatory processes, but
also to appreciate any shortcomings in perceived solutions to these problems. In
the following section, I outline these shortcomings, describing the legal and
social barriers to the successful development of rapidly evolving technologies
generated by each response to the pacing problem and the ways in which these
barriers could negatively impact the development of autonomous vehicles.203
1. Potential Drawbacks of Failing to Regulate
The most basic response to the pacing problem is to do nothing—leave
existing laws in place and refrain from enacting new laws. Although there is a
seductive simplicity and certain advantages to taking a hands-off approach to
regulating rapidly evolving technologies,204 the failure to amend existing laws
or enact new laws can create both regulatory uncertainty for market
participants and low public confidence in the safety of new technologies.
a. Regulatory Uncertainty
As new technologies give rise to novel “forms of conduct” and new
“activities and relationships,” existing laws “may not operate as effectively as
they did in the past.”205 The disconnect between existing law and innovation can
generate significant regulatory uncertainty for market participants.206 This
uncertainty can take at least three forms: (1) potential prohibitions on a new technology, (2) application of ambiguous legal terms and concepts to a new technology, and (3) superfluous rules governing the design or use of a new technology.207
203

The purpose of this section is not to establish that these regulatory responses have no utility or
are never appropriate; rather, its purpose is to emphasize that perceived solutions to the pacing
problem can themselves create obstacles to the commercial success of emerging technologies.
204
Cf. Demissie, supra note 1, at 340 (describing inaction and deregulation as “regulatory
vogue”).
205
Lyria Bennett Moses, Agents of Change: How the Law ‘Copes’ with Technological
Change, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 763, 767 (2011); see also Mandel, supra note 175, at 568 (“[I]t
should be anticipated that preexisting legal regimes may run into problems when being used
to govern technology that did not exist when the regimes were created.”).
206
See generally Moses, supra note 147, at 253-57 (discussing the problem of legal
uncertainty as it relates to new technologies).
207
As should be obvious from the following subsection, these categories are not mutually
exclusive and frequently overlap. The subsection, moreover, is not intended as an exhaustive
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Prohibitions in Existing Laws

First, existing laws may prohibit the production, sale, or specific uses
of an emerging technology. In most cases, such prohibitions are inadvertent
and result from technological developments which could have never been
anticipated when lawmakers drafted the relevant statute or regulation.208 In
particular, a new relationship, activity, or type of conduct made possible by
an emerging technology may “fall within a rule despite being irrelevant to
[its] goals.”209 Notwithstanding the inadvertent nature of these prohibitions,
failing to amend existing laws or enact new laws can leave developers,
retailers, and users of new technologies in a precarious position. Indeed, as
long as outdated rules remain in force, market participants must depend on
the enforcement discretion of federal and state agencies, creating an unstable
and potentially inconsistent legal environment for all parties.210
A classic example of existing law impeding the adoption of a new
technology is the traditional common law rule that land is owned usque ad
coelum, or infinitely upwards.211 In the pre-aviation era, this rule stood for the
intuitive proposition that a land owner is entitled to the exclusive use of any air
space above his property.212 However, as aviation technologies started to
analysis of every type of uncertainty; it aims, instead, to highlight several of the most
disruptive types of uncertainty arising from inaction.
208
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 25, ch. 600, 1991 Va. Acts 1111 (amending VA. CODE § 32.1-289.1
(1991), which was intended to prohibit the sale of organs, so that women could sell ova for in
vitro fertilization, the donation of which was technologically impossible when the law was
originally passed); see also Moses, supra note 146, at 400-01 (discussing more generally
inadvertent prohibitions in the context of over and under-inclusive laws); Moses, supra note 147,
at 260-64 (discussing issues with statutory ambiguities resulting in under or over-inclusiveness of
prohibitions applied to technological developments and providing relevant examples in ADA
designations, railroad owner liabilities, and computer and internet related complications).
209
See Moses, supra note 147, at 260 (“New artifacts, activities, and relationships may fall
within a rule despite being irrelevant to their goals . . . .”).
210
See Mandel, supra note 175, at 564–65 (describing such problems in the context of
biotechnology and nanotechnology).
211
See Moses, supra note 146, at 399 (offering this example); see also Lora D. Lashbrook, The
“Ad Coelum” Maxim As Applied to Aviation Law, 21 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 143, 146–7, 154
(1946) (applying the ad coelum doctrine to commercial air travel in the United States).
212
See, e.g., Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1922) (finding that the
plaintiff had an arguable claim to trespass for shooting a bullet across the land of another);
Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93, 94–95 (Iowa 1902) (affirming the vitality of usque ad
coelum in a claim involving the thrusting of an arm across the property of another);
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1290, 1291–92 (Ky. App. 1907)
(finding an unlawful trespass by defendant for extending boards from a telephone pole across
the land of another); see also Lashbrook, supra note 211, at 143–46 (summarizing the
doctrine’s historical development); Moses, supra note 146, at 399 (same).
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emerge, the doctrine threatened to complicate efforts to commercialize air
travel, as it would have effectively prohibited the operation of balloons and
airplanes since every flight over private land risked being prosecuted as a
trespass.213 Although courts eventually stepped in to circumscribe the doctrine
and allow commercial aviation to move forward,214 early participants faced
legal uncertainty as a result of the unanticipated intersection between property
law and aviation technologies.215 Without judicial intervention—a possibility
only in the common law context—new aviation technologies could have
remained grounded.
Although less pronounced, developers of autonomous vehicles also
face uncertainty with respect to performance standards and the legality of
general and specific applications of their products.216 At the international level,
for example, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, to which the U.S.
is a party, requires every vehicle to have a “driver” who is “at all times . . . able
to control [it].”217 Although an intuitive requirement with respect to the safe
213

See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COST LIVES 28 (2008) (observing if the doctrine was enforced literally “then crossing each [air] column without permission [would have been] a trespass”).
214
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (holding that the ad coelum doctrine
“has no place in the modern world”); see also Johnson v. Curtiss N.W. Airplane Co., 1928 U.S.
Av. Rep. 42 (Minn. D. Ct. 1923) (finding the common law principle inapplicable to aviation
because “[m]odern progress and great public interests should not be blocked by unnecessary legal
refinements”); Commonwealth v. Nevin, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 39, 41 (Pa. D. & C.2d 1922)
(refusing to apply trespass law where the law did not clearly contemplate airplane travel); Roger
F. Williams, The Existence of the Right to Flight, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 738–40 (1931)
(discussing prior cases involving trespass across property by airplanes to support the proposition
that there exists a right to flight across private property).
215
Indeed, legal scholars vigorously debated the extent of property rights in air space and
whether airplanes could operate without some exercise of a state’s power of eminent domain
or police power. See generally Arthur L. Newman, Aviation Law and the Constitution, 39
YALE L.J. 1113, 1127–29 (1930) (summarizing the conflict between property rights and
aviation and the legal arguments made during litigation of trespass claims).
216
See, e.g., ANITA KIM ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION ADMIN., REVIEW OF
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES 8-21
(2016) (identifying FMVSS which “may pose challenges to the introduction of automated
vehicles”); Letter from Chris Urmson, Director, Google Self-Driving Car Project, to Paul A.
Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Google Letter] (on
file with the author) (requesting NHTSA interpretations on a number of FMVSS which could
render all or part of Google’s autonomous vehicle design illegal); see also NHTSA POLICY
2016, supra note 8, at 48-52 (suggesting that existing vehicle safety standards may prohibit
some autonomous vehicle technologies, or at least create this perception among market
participants, by noting the importance of agency interpretation letters and the need to issue
such interpretations and exemptions on an expedited basis).
217
Geneva Convention on Road Traffic art. 8, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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operation of traditional vehicles, such a mandate could prevent the lawful use
of autonomous vehicles, at least to the extent that no human is able to intervene
in the automated vehicle’s operation.218 Similarly, at the federal level,
compliance with many FMVSS is contingent upon the presence of a human
“driver” and controls like a steering wheel.219 Vehicle codes in several states
also outlaw the operation of a vehicle without “one hand” remaining on the
steering mechanism.220 These rules, clearly designed with traditional vehicles
in mind, have the potential to impede the development of fully automated
vehicles, which specifically aim to eliminate active human control over vehicle
movements.221 Although regulators are unlikely to enforce such prohibitions,
leaving these laws on the books creates additional risk and uncertainty for
investors in autonomous vehicle technologies.
ii.

Ambiguous Terms and Concepts in Existing Laws

Second, new technologies may also reveal “latent ambiguities” in the
terms and concepts contained in existing laws.222 Such ambiguities often arise
“where new technology or new forms of conduct do not fit easily into existing
conceptual and legal categories.”223 A word or idea may have had a straight218

But see Smith, supra note 7, at 433-41 (concluding that, at least under international law,
“the term ‘driver’ is probably flexible”); Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with
Automated Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (seeking public comment
on ways to remove “regulatory barriers in the existing [FMVSS]”); infra pp. 45–46
(discussing whether computers might qualify as drivers).
219
See ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 1–2, 10–11 (“If manufacturers want to sell
vehicles only intended for automated operation, with no way for human occupants to drive
the vehicle, they are likely to have difficulty certifying to requirements for a foot-actuated
service brake control (517.135), a designated seating position for the driver (571.207), a
steering wheel (a requirement for completing tests specified in 571.126), and certain controls
and displays.”); see also Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with Automated
Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (further describing “regulatory barriers
in the existing [FMVSS]”).
220
See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1226 (detailing the requirements for handling a
steering mechanism); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 13 (specifying the requirements for
operating a vehicle).
221
State laws requiring minimum spacing between vehicles could also complicate efforts to
use autonomous vehicles in tightly grouped platoons. See Smith, supra note 7, app. 1 at 51821 (listing and analyzing such laws).
222
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 at 25-26, 155-56 (2006); see also Mandel, supra
note 175, at 553 (“[W]here [a] new issue arises as a result of technological change, . . . old
categories may no longer apply.”); Moses, supra note 147, at 257 (“Some legal categories
and concepts become ambiguous in light of technological change.”).
223
Moses, supra note 146, at 396.
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forward meaning or application in its original context, but technological
innovations, among other developments, may allow for multiple, often
competing ways of interpreting or applying the same words and concepts.224 A
good example is the shifting definition of what it means to be a person’s lawful
“mother.”225 Traditionally, a mother was “the woman who bore a child and
contributed to its genetic identity.”226 With the development of in vitro
fertilization, however, the mother of a child could be at least two people: the
woman who provides the ovum and the woman who serves as the surrogate.227
Although innocuous on its face, this ambiguity has generated significant
uncertainty in states with laws granting custody of child to its “mother,” as the
term could reasonably apply to both the donor and the surrogate.228
The same types of ambiguities are present in the laws governing
traditional vehicles. A particularly important ambiguity involves the terms
“driver” and “operator.” As described above, the Geneva Convention
requires that a “driver” be able to control a vehicle at all times.229 Many
federal and state regulations also impose specific obligations on the “driver”
or “operator” of a vehicle.230 When natural persons were the only entities
physically controlling vehicles, the meaning of these terms was generally
clear.231 As applied to autonomous vehicles, however, the terms are
ambiguous.232 In particular, it is not always clear whether a “driver” or
“operator” of a vehicle also encompasses the computer which controls an
224

See Lessig, supra note 222, at 25 (describing this problem).
See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 113 (1997).
226
Moses, supra note 147, at 257.
227
Id.
228
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (addressing the question of whether
the donor or surrogate was the “natural mother” of a child born through in vitro fertilization under
California law). Of course, not every custody statute leaves the term “mother” undefined and
many states have amended their laws to include a definition of the term. See Susan L. Crockin &
Gary A. Debele, Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer for Family Law Attorneys, 27
ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 289, 340-43 (2015) (surveying the law around
sperm and egg donation).
229
See Convention on Road Traffic, supra note 217.
230
See ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 3-4, 17-25 (identifying every use of “driver” and
“operator” in the FMVSS); Smith, supra note 7, at 464 n.307 (listing state and federal regulations).
231
But not always. See, e.g., Fairman v. Mors, 130 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)
(holding that, under California law, “a[n] automobile incapable of moving under its own
power is not ‘driven’ by any of its occupants when being towed by another automobile”).
232
Cf. ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 18 (“[L]anguage throughout the FMVSS is
clear in a world where all vehicles require a human driver for manual control, but the
meaning of the term ‘driver’ could become less certain or different when considered in the
context of vehicles with increasingly automated capabilities.”).
225
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autonomous vehicle.233 The uncertainty generated by this ambiguity is further
compounded by the varying statutory and common law definitions of the terms,
each of which could lead to slightly different results.234 In some states, for
example, the driver of an autonomous vehicle could be the computer; in others
it could be the owner; still in others it could be the person who summoned or
started the vehicle.235 When making investment decisions, individuals and firms
may struggle with this ambiguity, unsure of the liabilities they could incur or the
ways in which an autonomous vehicle could be lawfully used.
iii.

Superfluous Requirements and Limitations in Existing Laws

Finally, existing laws may impose unnecessary limitations or
requirements on the design or use of a new technology. Like the prohibitions
discussed above, these superfluous mandates are generally the result of
unforeseeable technological developments.236 In particular, a new relationship,
activity, or type of conduct made possible by an emerging technology may fall
within the scope of an existing rule despite being irrelevant to its goals.237
Consider the following scenario. A hypothetical city ordinance prohibits the use
of motorcycles in a park frequented by birdwatchers because motorcycles are
loud and would scare away the birds. Ten years after the ordinance is passed,
engineers develop a new technology which allows motorcyclists to operate their
vehicles silently. If the ordinance remained unchanged, motorcycles would still
be excluded from the park, even though doing so would no longer serve the
purpose of the ordinance. This overbreadth would mean that the new technology
would itself be legal, but its utility and potential benefits could be substantially
limited, at least in so far as one intended benefit of the technology was to open
more public spaces to motorcyclists.
233

See, e.g., Google Letter, supra note 216 (seeking clarification on this matter under FMVSS); see
also Smith, supra note 7, at 463–80 (considering this question under a range of existing state laws).
234
See Smith, supra note 7, at 464 n.307 (listing virtually every different state, federal, and
international law definition of “driver” and “operator”).
235
See Smith, supra note 7, at 476–80 (exploring these possibilities); see also Jack Karsten
& Darrell West, The State of Self-Driving Car Laws Across the U.S., BROOKINGS (May 1,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/05/01/the-state-of-self-driving-carlaws-across-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/THW9-LJMB] (“[I]ndividual states . . . differ on
basics like the definition of ‘vehicle operator.’ Tennessee SB 151 points to the autonomous
driving system (ADS), while Texas SB 2205 designates a ‘natural person’ riding in the
vehicle. Meanwhile, Georgia SB 219 identifies the operator as the person who causes the
ADS to engage, which might happen remotely in a vehicle fleet.”).
236
See Moses, supra note 147, at 260-64 (discussing superfluous mandates in the context of
over-inclusive rules resulting from technologic change).
237
Id.
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In most states, these same types of unnecessary limitations and
requirements are imposed on autonomous vehicles. The aim of state vehicle
codes, for instance, is to maximize the safety of vehicle operators and
pedestrians. To that end, all states prohibit individuals from either “driving,”
“operating” or “being in control” of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.238 These
laws make sense if a natural person is the one actually controlling the vehicle. If
a natural person is only a passenger in a fully automated vehicle, however, it
makes far less sense to prohibit that person from riding in the vehicle while
intoxicated. Nevertheless, the vehicle codes in some states may still categorize
the human passenger in an autonomous vehicle as its “driver” or “operator.”239
In such states, simply riding in an autonomous vehicle while intoxicated would
likely constitute the unlawful act of intoxicated driving. Thus, to the extent that
one purpose of autonomous vehicles is to increase mobility while improving
public safety, these laws would add legal uncertainty for investors and
undermine at least one potential benefit of the technology.240
b. Reduced Public Confidence in Safety
In addition to legal uncertainty, regulatory inaction can also undermine
public confidence in the safety of a new technology. The importance of public
confidence cannot be overstated.241 If consumers are unwilling to purchase or
238

See James O. Pearson, Jr., What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or Being in Control of
Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or Ordinance, 93 A.L.R.
3d 7 (1979) (compiling drunk-driving laws).
239
See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
240
The same is true of distracted driving laws, which could prevent autonomous vehicle
passengers from engaging in productive activities while on the road. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit.
47, § 11-901b (“The operator of every vehicle, while driving, shall devote their full time and
attention to such driving.”); GA. CODE § 40-6-241 (prohibiting drivers from “engag[ing] in any
actions which [would] distract [the] driver from the safe operation of [a] vehicle”); ARK. CODE §
27-51-104 (prohibiting any person from “driv[ing] or operat[ing] any vehicle in such a careless
manner as to evidence a failure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise,
or in such a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper control”).
241
See Barack Obama, Self-Driving, Yes, But Also Safe, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 19,
2016, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2016/09/19/Barack-Obama-Self-driving-yesbut-also-safe/stories/201609200027 [https://perma.cc/RH35-7XXX] (“The quickest way to slam
the brakes on innovation is for the public to lose confidence in the safety of new technologies.”);
Gregory N. Mandel, Emerging Technology Governance, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS
FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 60 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2013) (“[P]ublic confidence in
an emerging technology and its governance is critical to the success of the technology.”); Douglas
J. Sylvester et al., Not Again! Public Perception, Regulation, and Nanotechnology, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 165, 168 (2009) (“[P]ublic opinion is crucial to the success and integration of new
technologies. If the public turns against a technology, its likelihood of success (however defined)
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use a new technology due to concerns about safety—whether justified or not—
then the potential benefits of a new technology are virtually guaranteed to
remain unrealized.242 Importantly, the degree to which a technology is
regulated relates to public confidence in at least two ways. First, to the extent
that imposing minimum safety standards on a new technology actually reduces
the probability of harmful events, the regulated technology is likely to be
perceived as safer.243 Since most people first hear about a new technology
through the media,244 highly publicized incidents involving the technology
could cause people to overestimate its risks.245 Second, a growing body of
research suggests that public confidence in unfamiliar technologies depends at
least in part on their level of regulation.246 This may be especially true in the
wake of high-profile accidents involving such technologies.247
is greatly reduced.”); Lynn L. Bergeson, Avoid Mistakes of the Past: Develop Nano Responsibly,
22 ENVTL. L. F. 41, 41 (2005) (arguing that “the public’s perception of safety is essential” and
that “no emerging technology will survive without broad public support”).
242
Cf. Lin, supra note 6, at 378 (“[P]ublic mistrust and suspicion . . . can ultimately hamper
even beneficial uses of a new technology.”).
243
Cf. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 471
(2016) (“Federal regulation [can] significantly reduce the risk of reverse entrenchment by
controlling experimentation and ensuring that all firms take sufficient care to avoid [harmful
events] that could impede public acceptance [of new technologies].”).
244
See, e.g., JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, INFORMED
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8 (2005) (finding respondents most likely to have heard of nanotechnology a media source first).
245
See W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657,
1668 (1997) (finding that that consumers often misperceive the risks they face and overemphasize
information claiming high risks); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases,
and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 82 (2002) (“[V]ivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can
‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of a disaster
is really small.”); Sylvester et al., supra note 241, at 175 (“As the media and interest groups
emphasize certain risks, the images they create can overwhelm objective information.”).
246
See, e.g., MACOUBRIE, supra note 244, at 19 (finding this to be true in the context of
nanotechnology); Christian Gollier & Nicholas Treich, Decision-Making Under Scientific
Uncertainty, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 77, 97 (2003) (discussing some of the empirical
research); see also Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725 (“[I]t seems that the establishment of a
regulatory scheme is a prerequisite for maintaining public trust, providing another rationale for
adoption of regulation beyond the substantive need for such provisions.”); Moses, supra note 124,
at 526 (“Sometimes, the mere exercise of centralized control can allay public fears as to the
direction the technology might otherwise take.”); William Birnbauer, Nano Could be a Huge
Future Health Crisis, THE AGE (Oct. 30, 2005), https://www.theage.com.au/national/nano-couldbe-a-huge-future-health-crisis-20051030-ge1561.html (arguing in the context of nanotechnology
that “[t]he early introduction and explanation of regulation reduces the risk that public concern
will prevent acceptance” of a technology).
247
Cf. MACOUBRIE, supra note 244, at 10 (finding that public perceptions of nanotechnology,
which tend to favor greater regulation, also correlate to concerns about past high-profile
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There is already data to suggest that consumers harbor serious concerns
about the safety of autonomous vehicles and their lack of oversight.248
According to a recent study, only one in four U.S. consumers would trust an
autonomous vehicle to transport them as a passenger.249 These misgivings were
on full display following several crashes involving fully and partially automated
vehicles in 2017 and 2018.250 As one commentator rushed to note following an
accident involving a Tesla vehicle, “[t]he race . . . to develop self-driving cars
has been fueled by the belief that computers can operate a vehicle more safely
than human drivers, but that view is now in question.”251 Consistent with that
reaction, consumer trust in autonomous vehicle safety has slipped in the wake of
these incidents252 and a number of commentators and politicians have called for
“environmental . . . and human health errors”); cf. also notes 252‒53 (discussing the paucity
of autonomous vehicle regulations, the drop in consumer confidence following high-profile
accidents involving autonomous vehicles, and the subsequent calls for greater regulation).
248
See generally ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, CARAVAN PUBLIC OPINION
POLL: DRIVERLESS CARS (2018) (surveying consumer attitudes toward autonomous vehicles
and finding that significant segments of the U.S. population are skeptical of autonomous
vehicle safety); Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase IIIB, AAA (May 22, 2018),
https://publicaffairsresources.aaa.biz/download/10980/ (same); WORLD ECON. FORUM,
SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN AN URBAN CONTEXT (2015); BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL
SIVAK, UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RESEARCH INST., A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT
AUTONOMOUS AND SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN THE U.S., U.K., AND AUSTRALIA (2014); see
also Nikhil Menon, Consumer Perception and Anticipated Adoption of Autonomous Vehicle
Technology: Results from Multi-Population Survey 6-10 (Oct. 27, 2015) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of South Florida) (on file with author) (summarizing much of the empirical
research on consumer attitudes toward autonomous vehicles).
249
See Craig Giffi et al., The Race to Autonomous Driving: Winning American Consumers’ Trust,
20 DELOITTE REV. 74, 85 (finding 74% of U.S. consumers believe that autonomous vehicles are
unsafe); Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey– Phase IIIB, supra note 248 (same); ADVOCATES
FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, supra note 248, at 2 (finding the same for 64% of consumers).
250
See, e.g., Paul Eistenstein, Fatal Crash Could Pull Plug on Autonomous Vehicle Testing
on Public Roads, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/
fatal-crash-could-pull-plug-autonomous-vehicle-testing-public-roads-n858151 [https://perma.cc/
4Z8B-4JRD] (reporting on consumer, industry, and lawmaker reactions to these incidents).
251
Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, Self-Driving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S.
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/selfdriving-tesla-fatal-crash-investigation.html.
252
Compare Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase IIIB, supra note 248, at 1
(finding that, in April 2018, 73% of U.S. consumers “would be afraid to ride in a fully selfdriving vehicle”) with Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase III, AAA (Jan. 24,
2018), https://publicaffairsresources.aaa.biz/download/9852/ (finding that, in December
2017, 63% of U.S. consumers “would be afraid to ride in a fully self-driving vehicle”); see
also Andrew J. Hawkins, Self-Driving Car Crashes Put a Dent in Consumer Trust, Poll Says,
The VERGE (May 22, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380374/self-drivingcar-crash-consumer-trust-poll-aaa (reporting on the drop in consumer confidence).
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increased government oversight.253 In the autonomous vehicle industry, where
success is dependent on convincing people to switch from active driving to
passive riding, doubts about vehicle safety could pose a serious threat to
widespread commercial adoption.254
Indeed, as illustrated throughout history, a single incident involving a
new technology can undermine years of development and marketing.255 The
infamous explosion that destroyed the Hindenburg in 1937 is perhaps the
most vivid example, but other high profile incidents involving nuclear
power,256 genetically modified foods,257 and gene therapy258 have spurred
similar levels of public angst and industry collapse. As one scholar observes,
“each of these incidents sparked subsequent official investigations and media
253

See, e.g., Ross Marchand, Put Driverless Cars Back in the Slow Lane, REALCLEARPOLICY
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/02/15/put_driverless_cars_
back_in_the_slow_lane_110511.html (“In light of these data, policymakers must press for
more safety before permitting driverless vehicles on the open road without human testers.”);
Sam Thielman, ‘Someone is Going to Die’: Experts Warn Lawmakers Over Self-Driving
Cars, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar
/15/self-driving-cars-danger-senate-general-motors-google (“The robot car revolution hit a
speed bump . . . as senators and tech experts sounded stern warnings about the potentially
fatal risks of self-driving cars.”).
254
See Wansley, supra note 243, at 470 (arguing that “early, high profile collisions” could
“turn public sentiment against” autonomous vehicles and impede their development); see
also Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145,
1152 (2012) (“It is unclear how . . . the public will react to accidents involving robotic cars.
Overreaction is a clear danger, even if it could be shown that a transition to autonomous
vehicles leads to far fewer traffic-related deaths.”).
255
See Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725 (“[A] single incident gone awry [can]
undermin[e] years of careful planning and building of regulatory system.”); see also
CALESTOUS JUMA, INNOVATION AND ITS ENEMIES: WHY PEOPLE RESIST NEW
TECHNOLOGIES (2016) (discussing examples of resistance to new technologies).
256
See JOHN D. GRAHAM, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE PERILS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 3 (2004)
(suggesting that there has been “a de facto moratorium on construction of nuclear power
plants” in the United States since the accident at Three Mile Island); see also J. V.
REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE
THREE MILE ISLAND (1994) (examining the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and its impact
on the nuclear power industry).
257
See Mandel, supra note 241, at 47-48 (“The early stages of genetically modified food
development in the United States provides a poster-child example of how significant public
concern over a technology—and the perception that it is not being managed properly—can
thwart technological development.”).
258
Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Gene Therapy’s Troubling Crossroads: A Death Raises
Questions of Ethics, Profit, Science, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 1999), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/31/055r-123199-idx.html (exploring the death of a
participant in a gene therapy clinical trial).
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scrutiny that revealed significant flaws and failures in the regulatory system,”
the results of which “severely undermined public trust in both the technology
at issue . . . and the regulatory programs responsible for the oversight of that
technology.”259 It is true that taking regulatory action does not guarantee that
a new technology will escape negative publicity or scrutiny of its oversight;
however, common sense suggests that inaction increases both the probability
of accidents and the severity of public fallout.
2. Potential Drawbacks of Regulatory Action
Despite the potential drawbacks of responding to the pacing problem
through inaction, responses based on regulatory action can also have a
number of drawbacks. As described above, there are, broadly speaking, two
potential affirmative responses to the pacing problem: a precautionary
approach and a future-facing approach. The future-facing approach can be
further broken down into regulations which mandate specific characteristics
or forms of a technology and regulations which are technology neutral. I
address the drawbacks of each in turn.
a. Precautionary Principle: Forgone Benefits and Stunted Innovation
The aim of a regulatory approach informed by the precautionary
principle is to temporarily slow or halt the development of a new technology
until it is explicitly proven safe.260 As a response to the pacing problem, a
precautionary approach provides regulators with additional time and
information to design and enact regulatory regimes which are calibrated to
the idiosyncrasies of unfamiliar new technologies.261 Although information
about the risks and applications of an emerging technology are important
considerations when drafting regulations, and regulators may otherwise
struggle to effectively manage such risks in a timely manner, there are two
major drawbacks to artificially constraining the rate at which a new
technology can develop.262
259

Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725.
See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
261
Id.
262
For a comprehensive summary of precautionary principle critiques, see Wood et al., supra
note 154, at 589–607. Two additional problems worth noting are the lack of a consensus definition
of the precautionary principle, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1513 (Dennis J.
Paustenbach ed., 2002) (recognizing that there is no single definition for the precautionary
principle and that existing definitions are “varied” and “often vague”), and disagreements over
260
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First, using law to slow or halt the development of a new technology
forces consumers to forgo its potential benefits.263 This is a seemingly obvious
consideration, but the “benefits of [new] activities are commonly ignored when
[precautionary] regulation is contemplated.”264 In the case of autonomous
vehicles, for example, regulators in California recently considered an indefinite
moratorium on the private sale and commercial use of autonomous vehicles.265
Although they ultimately decided against it, the move would have allowed
regulators to collect additional information and extend the lifespan of their
initial rules. At the same time, however, preventing the sale of autonomous
vehicles, or even simply mandating that a licensed driver always be present in
“the driver seat of the vehicle,”266 would have prevented the public from
realizing many of the potential benefits of autonomous vehicles.267 Some of
the forgone benefits, such as any reduction in the number of traffic fatalities
attributable to human error, would have been easily quantifiable, while others,
such as increased mobility and independence for the elderly and disabled,
would have been much harder to quantify.
what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, see Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary
Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1-19 (Julian Morris ed.,
2000) (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” versions of the precautionary principle).
263
See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 851, 882-98 (1996) (arguing that the forgone benefits of new technologies are a significant
cost of taking a precautionary approach); see also Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, Precaution
Without Principle, 19 NATURE BIOTECH. 302, 302 (2001) (“What is missing from the
precautionary calculus is an acknowledgment that even when technologies introduce new risks,
most confer net benefits; that is, their use reduces many other, far more serious hazards.”).
264
Cross, supra note 263, at 882.
265
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.68 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.dmv.ca.
gov/portal/wcm/connect/ed6f78fe-fe38-4100-b5c21656f555e841/AVExpressTerms.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES.
266
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.52(a)(5) (proposed Dec. 16, 2015) (requiring the presence
of “an operator,” defined as a person “sitting in the driver seat of the vehicle,” at all times).
267
See Caleb Watney & Marc Scribner, Slowing Down Driverless Cars Would be a Fatal
Mistake, TECHDIRT (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180302/100450
39339/slowing-down-driverless-cars-would-be-fatal-mistake.shtml (“As a society, we can't
afford to wait until we are 100-percent certain that driverless cars are statistically safer than
humans before letting them on the roads.”); Ian Adams, Thoughtless Bureaucrats and Driverless
Cars, CITY JOURNAL (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.city-journal.org/html/thoughtless-bureaucratsand-driverless-cars-14289.html (“Why would the state pursue policies to discourage the adoption
of vehicles that, by virtually all accounts, would be orders of magnitude safer than traditionally
operated vehicles?”). Indeed, one study estimates that it would take tens or even hundreds of years
to log sufficient miles on closed courses to adequately assess the safety of the vehicles when
compared to conventional vehicles. See NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, DRIVING TO
SAFETY: HOW MANY MILES OF DRIVING WOULD IT TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE RELIABILITY? 10-11 (2016).
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In addition, blocking or slowing the emergence of a new technology may
prevent the technology from achieving commercial viability or lead to a stunted
version of the technology.268 Although the precautionary principle does not aim
to ban all new technologies in perpetuity, constraining the development of a new
technology in its nascent stages may nevertheless preclude the type of
“experimentation and failure” necessary to develop an optimal product.269
Moreover, to the extent that a technology is excluded from the marketplace or a
stunted version is introduced, developers may struggle to establish a viable
consumer base.270 The requirement in some states, for instance, that autonomous
vehicles contain a licensed driver at all times, as well as the numerous references
to the “driver” or “operator” in existing FMVSS, could channel innovation away
from full automation—the technology with the greatest potential benefit—and
eliminate a sizable portion of the consumer base for autonomous vehicles,
including elderly and disabled persons without drivers licenses and autonomous
ridesharing companies.271
b. Future-Facing Mandates: Choosing the Wrong Path for a New
Technology
Second, future-facing mandates designed to minimize regulatory
revision, such as technology-specific designs or safety standards, also have
the potential to stunt the development of an emerging technology.272
Although attempting to anticipate or shape the evolution of a new technology
268

See Thierer, supra note 169, at 362-63; cf. also Cross, supra note 263, at 898-907 (describing
how taking too many precautions may lead to a stunted and less safe version of a new technology).
269
THIERER, supra note 168, at 27; see also GRAHAM, supra note 256, at 3 (“By its very
nature, technological innovation occurs through a process of trial-and-error and refinement,
and this process could be disrupted by an inflexible version of the precautionary principle.”);
Demissie, supra note 1, at 343 (“[T]he precautionary principle cannot ensure safety without
hindering innovation and development.”).
270
Cf. THIERER, supra note 168, at 28 (arguing that, “[i]n practical terms, the precautionary
principle results in . . . lower-quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and
a decline in the overall standard of living”).
271
See supra note 88 (listing state laws requiring the presence of a licensed human driver);
ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 3-4, 17-25 (identifying every use of the terms “driver”
and “operator” in the FMVSS).
272
See Lyria Bennett Moses, Sui Generis Rules, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 86-87 (2011) (providing an overview of
potential problems with laws which “assume a particular state of technology”). But cf. ORG.
FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., AUTOMATED AND AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: REGULATION
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 27 (2015) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (noting that “[p]roactive
policy, including specific rules, can provide companies the legal clarity they need to make
investment and deployment decisions”).
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is a natural response to the limited reactive and adaptive capabilities of
regulatory institutions, it requires a level of foresight virtually impossible for
lawmakers and regulators to achieve.273 “It is an unhappy fact of life,” Grant
Gilmore famously wrote, “that, while we can know the past only imperfectly,
we know the future not at all.”274 The consequences of wrongly forecasting
the evolution of a new technology, or attempting to shape its development
based on incomplete information or faulty assumptions, can be significant.275
A future-facing regulation, for example, can “lock in one pathway to
[adoption of a technology] over . . . potentially better one[s]” or “freeze
unrealistic expectations—high or low—into the law,”276 resulting in an
inferior technology forged by forces external to the market.277
273

See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (“Those
who issue a rule cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be applied,
and in the new circumstances, the rule may be hopelessly outmoded.”); Eugene Volokh,
Technology and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (1995) (identifying four
failures of technological prediction); Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U.
COLO. L. REV. 461, 467 (1967) (“Our best informed guesses about what is going to happen
next have an uncomfortable habit of missing the mark completely.”); Sarewitz, supra note
173, at 97 (providing that, “efforts to predict technological pathways as an input into
decision-making have been failures, and often absurd failures at that”); see also Obama,
supra note 241 (“Government sometimes gets it wrong when it comes to rapidly changing
technologies.”).
274
Gilmore, supra note 273, at 467. As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
observed: “[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know. . .[I]t is the
latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.” Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks at Department
of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript
.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
275
See Moses, supra note 272, at 87 (“Rules that assume a particular technological framework
are not only potentially distorting from a legal perspective, but they may distort technology as
well. Potential avenues for technological change may remain unexplored in order to remain within
the technological paradigm assumed beneficial by a law. Alternatively, technology may be
redesigned in socially and economically unproductive ways in order to avoid the application of
onerous regulation.”); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, The Regulation of Technology and the
Technology of Regulation, 26 TECH. IN SOC’Y 483, 489 (2004) (“Technology requirements,
intended to force industry . . . to upgrade, may foster the diffusion of existing technology across
industry, but ironically may stagnate innovation of new technologies by specifying a particular
technology and giving no incentives for further improvements.”).
276
OECD REPORT, supra note 272, at 6.
277
See Scribner, supra note 171, at 1 (contending that, “laws and regulations that narrow the
scope of permissible development, testing, and operational functionality risk locking in inferior
technology, delaying adoption, and increasing prices faced by consumers”); see also Birnhack,
supra note 189, at 43 (“[A] legislative endorsement of one particular technology might cause a
technological lock-in: the chosen technology will be used even if there are superior technologies.
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The risks of future-facing regulatory mandates are particularly acute
in the context of autonomous vehicles.278 There are multiple competing
manifestations of the technology currently under development279 and
numerous visions for how autonomous vehicles should be introduced to
consumers.280 It would be virtually impossible for state or federal regulators
to determine which pathway would be best or to predict the precise pathway
along which autonomous vehicles will actually develop.281 The autonomous
vehicle industry, recognizing this fact, has protested vocally against
regulations which purport to do just that.282 “It’s really hard to try and
Once a technology is implemented and widely used, there are costs of switching to other
technologies . . . . If the switching costs are higher than the perceived benefit, a technological
lock-in would occur, even though the locked-in technology is inferior to newer ones.”).
278
See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 79 (recognizing that, “given the speed and
extent of [technological] evolution, even the most performance-oriented and forwardlooking [autonomous vehicle] testing protocols rapidly could become out-of-date, ineffectual
and even obstructive”).
279
See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 58-72 (describing the range of autonomous vehicle
technologies and configurations currently available and under development); RICHARD T.
BAKER & JASON WAGNER, POLICY PATHWAYS TO VEHICLE AUTOMATION 431 (2013)
(same); see also Bryant Walker Smith, How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving,
47 N.M. L. REV. 99 (2017) (arguing that there are at least three different technological
pathways to fully automated vehicles).
280
See, e.g., BAKER & WAGNER, supra note 279, at 431-36 (compiling the competing visions
of several industry representatives); Eva Fraedrich & Sven Beiker, Transition Pathways to
Fully Automated Driving and Its Implications for the Sociotechnical System of Automobility,
3 EUR. J. FUTURES RESEARCH 1, 5-11 (describing three possible “sociotechnical transition
scenarios”); CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH, SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT
REVOLUTION 16-17 (2012) (describing three “possible adoption scenarios”).
281
See Jeff Wise, How to Make Self-Driving Cars Safe, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE
(July 11, 2017), https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/articles/autonomous-vehicles-need-reg
ulation-but-who-designs-the-standards-1707.html (“It's important to recognize that we're
very much in early days; there's a lot we don't know; and whatever predictions we might
make, they're probably going to be completely wrong . . . .”); Alexander Hars, Five Guiding
Principles for Autonomous Vehicle Policy, DRIVERLESS-FUTURE.COM (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.driverless-future.com/?p=683 (“There are so many paths that this technology can
take, so many changes in many different areas of business and society, so many proponents
and possibly opponents that it is hard to be right about the path of technology and –
consequently – of law.”); Mark Scribner, Driverless Cars Are on the Way: Here’s How Not
to Regulate Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
driverless-cars-are-on-the-way-heres-how-not-to-regulate-them/2012/11/02/a5337880-21f1
-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html?utm_term=.8543436a5d58 (“[N]o one knows precisely how autonomous vehicle technology will develop or be adopted by consumers . . . .”).
282
See, e.g., Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars are Legal, But Real Rules Would be Nice,
WIRED (May 15, 2015) https://www.wired.com/2015/05/self-driving-cars-legal-real-rulesnice/ (quoting industry representatives on their strong concerns with respect to the impact of
future-facing regulations); see also Moore, supra note 182 (“Fearing that the technology’s
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anticipate how the technology might be used in the future and write laws for
every eventuality,” Google recently stated through a spokesperson, and “[w]e
think policymakers should learn about the technology and see how people
want to use it first before putting a ceiling on innovation.”283 As one
commentator argues, future-facing mandates which “narrow the scope of
permissible development, testing, and operational functionality” of
autonomous vehicles risk “locking in inferior technology, delaying adoption,
and increasing prices faced by consumers.”284
c. Technology-Neutral Laws: Linear Innovation and
High Compliance Costs
Finally, technology-neutral regulation, which rejects the rigid
specificity of future-facing mandates, can also create barriers to the
emergence of new technologies. Technology-neutral laws are designed to be
independent of any particular technological context and use “broad, opentextured” language to increase the flexibility of regulations and avoid future
revisions based on technological advances.285 Like future-facing mandates,
the aim of technology-neutral laws—to minimize reliance on the rulemaking
machinery of regulatory institutions—is an intuitive response to the pacing
problem. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, reliance on technological
neutrality can stymie the development of emerging technologies in two
important ways.
First, although such rules purport to be untethered from specific
technologies and sufficiently flexible to handle future developments,
technology-neutral laws are still constrained by the unpredictable nature of
innovation.286 “In the abstract,” Brad Greenberg argues, “legislators can say
development could be stifled, Google has lobbied state lawmakers nationwide not to advance
any bills, even if they seem innocuous.”). As an Audi spokesperson remarked in the article:
“We see a danger of actions taken too early to govern piloted driving 10 to 20 years into the
future. Such laws would have little application to initial levels of piloted driving that will
emerge over the next few years. They could also jeopardize robust research needs.” Davies,
supra note 282.
283
Davies, supra note 282.
284
Scribner, supra note 171, at 1; see also NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 79 (“The
greater the amount of detail that is included in [autonomous vehicle] testing protocols to
maximize safety performance or address risks believed to be associated with current HAVs,
the greater the likelihood that detail might limit the use of future technologies.”).
285
Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1513.
286
See Moses, supra note 124, at 578 (“Language cannot be completely technology-neutral;
it is impossible to draft legislation with sufficient precision and clarity that addresses every
possible future technical variation.”).
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that they want an unknown B to be treated like a known A.”287 However, until
the “nature and capabilities of B are understood—until legislators have some
appreciation for how the law will affect B, and the attendant welfare costs
and benefits—it is impossible to evaluate the extent to which the law actually
should treat B like A.”288 Moreover, when lawmakers and regulators draft
new rules, they “[do] so from the vantage point of contemporary
technological limitations . . . [and] with extant technology in mind.”289 Thus,
Greenberg continues, “[l]ike the nineteenth-century farmer who imagines a
sharper plow but is unable to foresee the combustion engine, [regulators]
imagine linear advances from extant technology.”290 This can lead not only
to obsolescence, a problem in its own right, but laws which are poorly tailored
to future technologies or inadvertently discourage radical innovation.
Second, technology-neutral laws can generate high compliance costs
for market participants. When applied to new technologies, the inherently
vague and flexible terms of technology-neutral laws may prove ambiguous
or have an unclear purpose, scope, or effect.291 In particular, given the lack
of specificity in such laws, the task of finding purpose or meaning in their
terms and providing guidance to market participants often falls to the
courts.292 In areas of law heavily reliant on technology-neutral rules,
however, this lack of specificity has led to inconsistent and confusing
results.293 Where technology-neutral laws produce uncertainty with respect
to the scope or effect of a regulation, market participants must expend
additional resources on regulatory compliance and evaluating the risks of
investment; some developers may even respond to this uncertainty by exiting
the market or deferring investment.294 In the context of autonomous vehicles,
287

Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1526.
Id.
289
Id. at 1527.
290
Id.
291
Cf. id. at 1524-43 (describing these problems in the context of copyright law); cf. also
Moses, supra note 147, at 276-77 (“[I]t is often impossible to draft a rule that will be both
operationally effective and immune from problems related to technological change.”).
292
See, e.g., Paul M. Janicke, On the Cause of Unpredictability of Federal Circuit Decisions
in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 94 (2005) (“Patent statutes in the United
States have always been written in broad terms, leaving it to the courts to fill in details as
cases arise.”); Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1524-43 (describing the extensive litigation
stemming from problems of definition, scope, and consistency in copyright law).
293
See, e.g., Janicke, supra note 292, at 95-96 (arguing that technology-neutral language in
patent law “can hardly be expected to lead to predictability in the outcomes of court
resolution of the issues”).
294
See Birnhack, supra note 189, at 44 (“[T]he open-ended nature of a technology-neutral
legislation might have a chilling effect on developers of technology. Not knowing in advance
288
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where NHTSA has fallen back on its technology-neutral recall authority as
the primary mechanism for ensuring safety, industry participants have
warned that there is little clarity as to how the “unreasonable risk” standard
might apply to their products.295 At a moment when clarity is at a premium
for industry participants and consumers, reliance on technology-neutral laws
and regulations could lead to significant uncertainty for all parties.296
III. RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND
OTHER RAPIDLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES
The previous Part outlined three common responses to the pacing
problem, illustrated how these responses have manifested themselves in
the context of autonomous vehicle regulation, and described the obstacles
created by each to the widespread commercial adoption of rapidly evolving
technologies like autonomous vehicles. In essence, regulators of autonomous
vehicles and other emerging technologies face a maddening catch-22. On
the one hand, the less they regulate or the broader they phrase regulations,
the more disconnected law may become from its target or the less clarity
and certainty enjoyed by regulated entities and consumers.297 On the other
hand, the more certainty and confidence regulators attempt to provide
entities and consumers, the more likely it is that regulations will become
outdated, generate future ambiguities and uncertainty, or pigeonhole a
developing technology.298 In both cases, if regulators block or slow a
technology until its likely developmental path and risks are fully understood,
how the law might address their technology, they might refrain from pursuing it, perhaps to
the detriment of all. Details and specification can provide certainty.”).
295
See, e.g., Ryan Hagemann, Niskanen Ctr., Comments Submitted to the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration in the Matter of: Federal Automated Vehicle Policy
NHTSA-2016-0090 at 7 (Nov. 21, 2016), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/20
16/11/CommentsAutonomousVehicleStandardsNHTSA.pdf (offering examples and concluding that “a great deal of clarification will be needed for outlining the specifics of when
a recall order would be justified in the case of autonomous vehicles”); see also Skees, supra
note 64 (arguing that NHTSA’s 2017 policy statement “lacks a clear interpretation for either
innovators or other policymakers. This may . . . increase regulatory uncertainty that stifles
development”).
296
Cf. Mike Ramsey, Autonomous Vehicles Fall into the Trough of Disillusionment, FORBES
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enroute/2018/08/14/autonomous-vehicles-fallinto-the-trough-of-disillusionment-but-thats-good/#20034c9a7b5a [https://perma.cc/UGF5-V88
X] (reporting on Audi’s announcement that it would not sell its most advance automated
technology in the U.S. because of a “lack of clarity on regulations”).
297
See supra Part II.B, sections (1)(a)(ii) & (2)(c).
298
See supra Part II.B, sections (1)(a)(i), (1)(a)(iii), & (2)(b).
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then its benefits—including any life-saving applications—will remain
unrealized or diluted.299 The challenge of this final Part, therefore, is to offer
an approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles which balances (1) the
realization of autonomous vehicles’ potential benefits, (2) the need for public
confidence in their safety, and (3) the potential pitfalls of future-facing
regulations.
A common attribute of the present and proposed regulatory responses
to autonomous vehicles is their overwhelming focus on identifying, ex ante,
the optimal substance for the rules governing autonomous vehicles.300 On its
face, this is a reasonable reaction to a new regulatory challenge and the
substance of regulations—whether prohibition, inaction, or something inbetween—is arguably the most important aspect of any regulatory
framework. At the same time, however, focusing excessively on substance
distracts from the root, underlying source of the regulatory challenge facing
autonomous vehicles: their rapid evolution and the limited reactive and
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions.301 Whether deliberately or
subconsciously, regulators and commentators have approached autonomous
vehicle regulation as if there is a single, optimal regulatory path waiting to be
discovered, and it is their responsibility, ex ante, to identify that path and
implement a corresponding framework (albeit at varying rates).302
Nevertheless, as described in the first half of Part II, the pacing problem is
299

See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a).
Whether that means deciding to refrain from enacting or promulgating new laws and
regulations, relying on precautionary regulation, or employing specific future-facing
regulations. Moreover, inaction is, in some cases, simply a way of buying time to draft an
optimal regulation. See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 10 (“Because . . . the
technical specifications for . . . automated systems are still in flux, the agency believes that
regulation of the technical performance of automated vehicles is premature at this time.”)
301
See supra Part II.A (discussing the lethargy of legislatures, agencies, and courts based on
a combination of political and procedural constraints); cf. Warren E. Walker et al., Adaptive
Policies, Policy Analysis, and Policy-Making, 128 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 282, 283
(2001) (“For very complex systems whose behavior we cannot predict . . . . it is appropriate
to separate the process by which policies are specified, assessed, chosen, and implemented
from the policies themselves.”).
302
California is a particularly poignant example, with the Department of Motor Vehicles
toiling over a final set of regulations for nearly 6 years. See Russ Mitchell, California
Regulations for Driverless Cars Stall as Other States Speed Ahead, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-driverless-regulations-california-20
170126-story.html (describing the California DMV’s rulemaking process for autonomous
vehicles) [https://perma.cc/8B4A-UF5H]; see also Driverless Testing and Public Use Rules
for Autonomous Vehicles Approved, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://
www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_17 [https://perma.cc/W2NC-X
EK5] (announcing the DMV’s approval of new regulations on autonomous technology).
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largely a function of institutional limitations related to the process of crafting
and enacting regulations,303 and the existing substantive responses to this
problem, particularly in the autonomous vehicle context, suffer from
deficiencies equal to or greater than those characterizing the underlying
problem.304These shortcomings suggest that a new approach to regulating
under the conditions of deep uncertainty created by the rapid evolution of
autonomous vehicle technology is needed.305 There are, no doubt, more and
less effective ways of regulating autonomous vehicles, but it is virtually
impossible, early in the life of a rapidly evolving technology, to identify both
an optimal regulatory approach and establish an enduring framework, all in
one shot.306 Instead, it makes far more sense to approach regulation in this
context as an iterative process, with the first regulations of autonomous
vehicles as an initial step, rather than the ultimate goal. In other words, the
approach to regulating autonomous vehicles must shift from one informed by
303

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B. There may very well be an “optimal” regulatory path, and it is my
hope that adaptive regulation can be used to eventually find that path, but it is foolhardy to
believe that, in the context of a paradigm shifting and rapidly evolving technology, such a
path can be identified from the start.
305
Annacoos Wiersema, discussing the pacing problem more generally, pointedly summarized
the challenge facing autonomous vehicles: “[W]e live in a complex society where laws
designed for particular purposes can have unanticipated consequences, where bureaucracy is
too slow and cumbersome to respond quickly and efficiently enough to those consequences,
and where the traditional structure of top-down lawmaking is under siege as too rigid, too
hierarchical, and too contentious to achieve its goals. The world we live in, as legal writers
spanning a range of fields tell us, requires new forms of governance.” Annecoos Wiersema, A
Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1241 (2008).
306
A growing body of literature examining other rapidly evolving technologies recognizes
as much. See, e.g., Warren E. Walker et al., Addressing Deep Uncertainty Using Adaptive
Policies: Introduction to Section 2, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 917, 919 (2010)
(“It is clear from experience that a static policy designed for a best estimate future is unlikely
to survive in a complex and dynamic policy setting.”); Lawrence E. McCray et al., Planned
Adaptation in Risk Regulation: An Initial Survey of U.S. Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 951, 952 (2010) (“Over time, things
change. Science evolves, technology advances, and implementation costs migrate, so
assumptions that were once reasonable can become much less supportable. When this occurs,
the delivered benefits of a policy decision and its actual social costs may fall substantially
out of the intended balance.”); Warren E. Walker et al., supra note 301, at 282-83 (“For very
complex systems whose behavior we cannot predict, policies based on best estimate models
can prove to be very fragile against unexpected events that happen all the time. . . . Such
policies are best for a future that most certainly will not occur, and have implications for the
future that actually occurs that are typically not examined in the course of policy design and
analysis or even revisited as that future unfold.”)
304
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the traditional paradigm emphasizing “static optimization” to one informed
by an “evolutionary paradigm” focused on adaptability.307 Such an iterative
model of regulation would depend upon federal and state regulatory
institutions “designed from the outset to expect, anticipate, and be able to . . .
recalibrate [regulations] quickly” in response to rapid technological change
and new information about risks, benefits, and the effects of existing rules.308
The most promising mechanism to keep autonomous vehicle regulation
“yoked to an evolving knowledge base,” and avoid the significant social and
technological pitfalls of regulatory inaction and prohibition, is planned adaptive
regulation.309 Although there is no single agreed upon definition of planned
adaptive regulation,310 a planned adaptive approach is generally characterized by
two fundamental attributes: (1) “a prior commitment, planned early in the
policy’s design, to subject the policy to periodic re-evaluation and potential
revision,” and (2) “a systemic effort or mechanism planned early in the policy’s
design, to monitor and synthesize new information for use in the reevaluations.”311 In turn, planned adaptive regulation “requires institutional307

See Barbra A. Cherry & Joannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation Contours of a Policy Model
for the Internet Economy 26 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). As Walker et
al. observe, consistent with my discussion of future-facing regulations in Part II, “[a] static policy
that is crafted to be robust under a range of plausible futures is a better starting point, but is still
not likely to perform under conditions of deep uncertainty.” Walker et al., supra note 306, at 919.
308
Marchant, supra note 156, at 202.
309
McCray et al., supra note 306, at 952. As Marchant explains, “[a]doptive governance derives
from the concept of adaptive management first developed in the context of ecology to experiment
with different policy approaches that are simultaneously undertaken with active monitoring,
assessment, and adjustment.” Marchant, supra note 156, at 202 (citing Adaptive Environmental
Assessment and Management and introducing the concept of adaptive management); see also Kai
N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the term “adaptive
management” to Holling's book). A growing literature advocates for analogous planned adaptive
approaches to regulation in other contexts, including drug therapy, climate change, and
biotechnology. See generally H-G Eichler et al., Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the
Evolution of Drug Approval, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 426 (2012) (drug
therapy); Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through A Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009) (climate change);
Kenneth Oye et al., On Revision of the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology 1 (Mar. 22, 2016) (White Paper prepared for the Biotechnology Working Group
of the U.S. Emerging Technologies Interagency Policy Coordination Committee) (on file with
the author) (biotechnology). In each of these contexts, regulators face a similar tradeoff between
potentially lifesaving technologies, risks to public safety, and the need for continued consumer
confidence in rapidly evolving and foreign technologies.
310
Walker et al. supra note 306, at 922.
311
INT’L RISK GOV. CTR., CONFERENCE REPORT: PLANNING ADAPTIVE RISK REGULATION
app. 2 at 26 (2016). A planned adaptive approach to regulation, while flexible in its own
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ization of monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental policy and
decision adjustments,” ex post, “where performance results can be evaluated and
the new information can be fed back into the ongoing regulatory process.”312 A
carefully conceived “framework for altering course, rapidly and frequently if
conditions warrant,” is thus an “essential ingredient[]”of a planned adaptive
approach to regulation in any context.313
In the context of autonomous vehicles, a planned adaptive approach
to design and operation would consist of four general dimensions: (1) initial
regulation, (2) intensive data collection, (3) independent assessment and
recommendations, and (4) agency consideration of recommendations and
adjustment.314 The first dimension, initial regulation, would not represent a
significant departure from the present notice and comment process and would
largely mirror the process in which NHTSA and select state departments of
transportation are currently engaged.315 The aim of initial regulations,
way, is distinct from “flexible regulation,” as used in the administrative law literature. See,
e.g., Lori S. Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Flexible Approaches to Environmental Regulation
1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-05, 2012). Whereas the term
“flexibility” is often used in reference to regulatory commands, targets, consequences, and
sources, id., the flexibility envisioned in this article is one step removed from these categories
and relates to flexibility in the process of reaching regulatory decisions—flexibility in
reaching a desired command, target, consequence, or even source of regulation. Within that
framework, a chosen regulation may be flexible in the traditional sense, e.g. by using a
general duty of care or a principle-based model, but is not necessarily so.
312
J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 30 (2005). This would, of course, require legislation exempting agencies from the
APA and analogous state statutes or amendment of the APA. See supra notes 306-11 and
accompanying text.
313
Ruhl, supra note 312, at 30. In the context of environmental regulation, at least one scholar
has laid out a more detailed eight-part protocol: “(1) definition of the problem, (2) determination
of goals and objectives for management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management actions,
(7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).” Robin Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014).
314
This framework, and the following discussion of the framework, are only a starting point
and present the broadest outline of what an adaptive approach to autonomous vehicle
regulation might look like. The aim is not to provide a detailed blueprint for regulatory
action, but rather to highlight the need for a planned adaptive approach, its advantages over
extant and proposed approaches to regulating autonomous vehicles, and the core features of
any such framework. For a more comprehensive discussion of proposed mechanisms for
implementing a planned adaptive regulatory system, see generally Craig & Ruhl, supra note
313; J.B. Ruhl, General Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems –
With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C.L. REV. 1373 (2011); Camacho,
supra note 309; Cherry & Bauer, supra note 307; Walker et al., supra note 301.
315
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the process by which NHTSA
enacts rules).

142

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Nov. 2018

however, would be to establish a relatively permissive legal environment
constrained only by minimum safety standards. As adaptive regulation is
premised on system feedback and adjustment, placing significant restrictions
on the design and operation of autonomous vehicles could prematurely
foreclose certain paths for technological development and data collection,
fostering many of the same problems associated with a precautionary
approach and technology-specific rules.316 Nevertheless, because regulation
is an important bulwark against unsafe technologies, and serves a signaling
function to consumers, autonomous vehicle manufacturers would need to
provide evidence reasonably suggesting that any proposed design or use is at
least as safe as traditional driving technology.317
The second dimension, intensive data collection, would require
autonomous vehicle manufacturers to gather and report data on all vehicle
testing, sales, and performance at regular intervals.318 In addition, relevant
federal and state agencies would be responsible for collecting data related to
consumer experience, as well as the economic and social impacts of autonomous
vehicles.319 This reporting and collection of data is essential to an adaptive
regulatory framework, as any decision to retain, reverse, or otherwise alter
existing regulations must be empirically driven and based on quantifiable costs,
316

See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a).
See NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, supra note 267, at 10-11 (proposing a similar
standard). This would generally track NHTSA’s standard for granting FMVSS exemptions
but would not place a cap on autonomous vehicle deployment and could be used as a premarket requirement. See 49 U.S.C. § 30113 (allowing for an exemption if, inter alia, the
applicant demonstrate that the safety level of its feature or vehicle “at least equals the safety
level of the standard”). On its face, the “at least as safe” standard seems like a burdensome
requirement analogous to a diluted precautionary approach. However, given the high rate of
traffic accidents and their overwhelming attribution to human error, see supra note 24, this
standard would be easy to satisfy. In addition, while initial regulations are important, they
carry far less weight in an adaptive system, except to the extent that they foreclose certain
future technological and regulatory opportunities. As such, it makes sense, at least initially,
to start with a permissive standard.
318
In its most recent policy statement, NHTSA outlined a much more modest and voluntary
vision of data collection with respect to limited categories of information. See NHTSA
POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 16 (“Entities engaged in ADS testing and deployment may
demonstrate how they address—via industry best practices, their own best practices, or other
appropriate methods– the safety elements contained in the Voluntary Guidance by publishing
a Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment.”). The bills currently pending in Congress also
contemplate some form of institutionalized data collection, though they provide few details
on its scope, content, and frequency. See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017); S. 1885, 115th
Cong. § 9 (2017).
319
This is not an exhaustive list of categories and agencies, within the boundaries of the law,
should be free to mandate reporting and engage in all data collection necessary to assess
regulatory performance.
317
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benefits, and risks. As such, because any adaptive regulatory framework is
dependent upon an effective feedback loop in the interval between regulation
and revision, regulators and stakeholders would need to place a premium on
designing effective surveillance and research mechanisms. Although the types
of reported and collected data would likely vary depending on the specific
subject of regulation (e.g. vehicle design or operation)—and may themselves
evolve over time as technology changes—the aim would always be to facilitate
back-end assessment of regulatory and technological impact.
The third dimension, independent assessment and recommendations
based on compiled data, is perhaps the most important. The assessment and
adjustment of existing regulations is at the heart of any adaptive system.320 At
the outset of each cycle of data collection and assessment, regulators, working
alone or with industry participants and the public, would identify principles or
objectives against which performance could be assessed.321 These objectives
would then guide each scheduled assessment, as well any unilateral emergency
actions by the agency. In the context of autonomous vehicles, however, the mere
act of assessment would be insufficient—it is equally important that this
assessment be conducted by an outside body composed of industry
stakeholders.322 Since adaptive regulation is a resource-intensive approach
320

See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 18 (identifying “monitoring, assessment, and
feedback” as common attributes of the different branches of adaptive management theory).
321
See Walker et al., supra note 306, at 920 (“[P]olicymakers and stakeholders, through
monitoring and corrective actions, . . . try to keep the system headed toward [its] original
goals.”). A major point of tension between a planned adaptive approach to regulation and
traditional administrative law theory is the value of public participation. See Craig & Ruhl,
supra note 313, at 28, 30 (“One of the critical values enshrined in contemporary
administrative law is public participation. . . . [A]daptive management threatens, or at least
is perceived to threaten, the promotion of public participation in traditional administrative
law.”). The initial articulation of goals and values guiding the evaluation of each iteration of
a regulatory system, however, offers an important opportunity for public participation in the
regulatory process. See Lawrence Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative
Adaptive Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47, 49-50 (2012) (pointing to
the setup phase of adaptive regulation as a promising moment for public participation).
Indeed, formulation of the plan itself is clearly a moment which lends itself to public input.
As Craig & Ruhl note, the requirement that agencies “engage in periodic evaluations of their
progress toward preidentified goals, and hence that they periodically comprehensively adjust
the management measures that they are employing, provides . . . perfect moments for
recurring, rather than continual, public participation.” Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 43.
322
The use of “deliberate organizational separation is a common feature” of existing regulatory
regimes reflecting a planned adaptive approach. McCray et al., supra note 306, at 958. In
particular, the “learning” function (reassessing the relevant evidence) is often isolated from the
“changing” function (deciding whether and how to re-craft the rule). See id. (“[T]he National
Transportation Safety Board assesses crash evidence, but works at some distance from the
licensing process at the Federal Aviation Administration, and for air pollution standards the
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which relies on continuous monitoring, experimentation, and assessment, as well
as potentially steep compliance costs,323 it is critical that regulators engage
industry stakeholders in the process of reaching regulatory decisions.324 This coownership over the regulatory process would not only introduce greater
predictability into the system for targeted entities, but allow targeted entities to
contribute their expertise and present their positions in a transparent manner.325
The expertise of industry stakeholders is particularly vital in the context of
autonomous vehicles, where the technology has developed at such a rapid rate
that significant informational and technical asymmetries exist between
stakeholders and the agencies tasked with overseeing them.326
The final dimension, adjustment, would require agencies to consider the
assessment and recommendation of the outside committee and make
adjustments as deemed necessary. Although the agency would be required to
consider any outside recommendations, such recommendations would be
precatory and any adjustments ultimately guided by the principles or objectives
identified in the planned framework.327 This separation of the “assessment” and
“changing” functions is a common attribute of existing adaptive systems328 and,
by placing decision making power with the agency, increases the likelihood of
science assessment is conducted in a unit that operates at some organizational distance from
EPA’s air pollution policy office.”).
323
See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (discussing costs as a potential drawback).
324
This process of outside review and recommendation most closely resembles the review
mechanism for ambient air quality standards carried out by the EPA pursuant to the Clean
Air Act, under which an independent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee reviews
data compiled by the EPA and issues a subsequent recommendation to the EPA
Administrator for consideration. See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 954 (describing this
arrangement).
325
Indeed, under notice and comment regimes, some work suggests that the majority of
industry lobbying occurs behind closed doors, before a notice of proposed rulemaking is
ever published. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plumber’: The
Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 59 (2013) (finding that
financial industry lobbyists succeeded in swaying “agencies to adopt favorable definitions,
interpretations, and exemptions [of the Volcker Rule] prior to the NPRM.”). The use of an
industry advisory board, in contrast, could channel industry positions into the open, as the
views of regulated entities would be based on publicly available data and clearly
represented in their published recommendations to the agency.
326
See Matt McFarland, How Can We Make Sure That Driverless Cars Are Safe?, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-1222-thedownload-driver
less-car-safety-20151222-story.html (describing state and federal regulators as “lacking expertise
in the rapidly emerging field”).
327
See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 52 (“These goals and objectives provide the overall
measures against which both the agency and the courts can measure progress in the adaptive
management process.”).
328
See supra note 322.
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reaching socially optimal outcomes.329 Moreover, although business must play
a central role in autonomous vehicle regulation, questions remain about the
efficacy of self-regulation and its viability in the context of emerging
technologies.330
There are, without a doubt, clear institutional and legal obstacles to
implementing a system of planned adaptive regulation for autonomous
vehicles at both the state and federal level.331 These obstacles would not only
require changes to the procedures governing agency rulemaking and
amendment,332 but also shifts in the way regulators, stakeholders, and courts
view the regulatory process.333 As one commentator notes, agencies “have
not often been rewarded for flexibility, openness, and their willingness to
experiment, monitor, and adapt.”334 As such, for adaptive regulation of
autonomous vehicles to succeed, “legislatures must empower [administrative
agencies] to do it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts must
resist the temptation to second-guess when [agencies] do in fact do it.”335 It
would, in short, require “substantial change” in existing structures and
assumptions underpinning administrative law.336 This paradigm shift is
329

Cf. Cary Coglianese, Engaging Business in the Regulation of Nanotechnology 1, 32 (Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-12, 2010) (“Just as James Madison said
that government would not be needed if men were angels, regulation of some kind would not
be needed if businesses already acted in socially optimal ways . . . .”).
330
See, e.g., Bennear & Coglianese, supra note 311, at 25-29 (describing the mixed results
of existing and past self-regulatory regimes). In addition, self-regulation could create a
further democratic deficit.
331
See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (mandating the procedures federal administrative
agencies must follow when considering, issuing, and revising rules).
332
This includes procedures related to the notice and comment process, see 5 U.S.C. § 553,
amendment of existing regulations, see 5 U.S.C. § 553, and judicial review, see 5 U.S.C. §
704.
333
See Ruhl, supra note 313, at 53-54 (“Legislatures, interest groups, and courts have become
acculturated to a ‘front-end’ style of command-and-control regulation that has dominated for
decades.”).
334
R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem Management?”, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 45 (1997).
335
Ruhl, supra note 312, at 31.
336
Id. at 31. See also Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to the Restoration of Aquatic
Systems and the Utilization of Adaptive Management, 23 VT. L. REV. 177, 197 (1998) (“In
order for agencies to be free to use adaptive management, the legal framework for decisionmaking . . . must explicitly recognize the flexibility needed to manage adaptively, yet still
provide a degree of finality to those parties affected by resource management
decisions. Solving this puzzle will require broader change rather than piecemeal legislation
or legal maneuvering within the existing legal framework.”). But see Timothy H. Profeta,
Managing Without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in Light of Ecological Advances,
7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 71, 96 (1996) (“As long as an adaptive management [project]
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certainly attainable, and some existing regulatory frameworks at the federal
level incorporate aspects of planned adaptive regulation, but it would not
occur naturally.337 Indeed, scholarship like this article will play an essential
role in highlighting the need for a shift by laying bare the shortcomings in
existing regulatory processes and the responses to these shortcomings.
Importantly, an increased emphasis on regulatory process—that is,
adaptability—over ex ante regulatory substance improves on common
responses to the pacing problem in two important ways. First, an adaptive
approach offers a middle ground between inaction and prohibition. Although
regulators may determine that autonomous vehicles are best governed with a
light touch, the potential safety risks associated with the technology and
fallout from highly visible accidents make it critical that some form of
government regulation guarantee minimum levels of safety and, just as
importantly, sow consumer confidence in the technology.338 At the same time,
embracing the opposite extreme and slowing the development of autonomous
vehicles in response to potential risks would be equally crude and forgo
significant benefits due to comparably small or unproven costs.339 The use of
a planned adaptive approach has the potential to occupy a productive
compromise between both extremes.
Second, given the desirability of some form of regulatory response,
an adaptive approach also offers clear advantages over future-facing and
technology-neutral laws. In particular, adaptive regulation avoids the pitfalls
of static mandates by responding to, rather than locking in or implicitly
anticipating, specific evolutions in autonomous vehicle technology. Instead
of making an educated guess as to the most likely or desirable developmental
path of autonomous vehicle technology, an adaptive approach allows for
adjustment based on real-world data, active debate, and changes in the market
or society. Moreover, although broadly worded technology-neutral rules may
be warranted based on the observed effects of prior regulations or some
aspect of future autonomous vehicle technology, regulators in a planned
adaptive system can offer greater clarity and specificity in their rules given
their iterative nature. In other words, there is no need to “future proof” laws
because, if warranted, they can always be revisited.
is approved pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, then each individual manipulation
in the management plan should not violate due process.”).
337
See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 954-56 (describing existing programs of planned
adaptation, including regulation of ambient air standards, commercial air transportation
safety, and post-market drug safety). For a full discussion of the legal obstacles facing an
adaptive approach to regulation, see generally Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 26-38.
338
See supra Part II.B, section (1)(b).
339
See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a).
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This is not to suggest that, as applied to autonomous vehicles, adaptive
regulation is without its flaws.340 An adaptive approach has the potential to
impose significant new costs on both administrative agencies and industry
stakeholders.341 These costs would stem from both the mandated collection and
assessment of data, as well as greater compliance costs related to the potential
unpredictability of future revision.342 In addition, scheduled revision and the
initial identification of goals could create a series of lobbying opportunities by
industry stakeholders, potentially adding to the already significant risk of
regulatory capture.343 There is also a chance, as mentioned above, that agency
officials would be reluctant to implement such a system due to institutional
inertia, a preference for the status quo, or concerns about agency credibility.344
Although these concerns deserve attention, most can be mitigated or
resolved. Industry involvement in the collection and analysis of impact data,
for example, should make any changes based thereupon reasonably
foreseeable and allow ample time for planning during the collection process.
In addition, given the potential prevalence of backroom lobbying under
notice and comment regimes, the use of an industry advisory board could
actually channel otherwise opaque industry positions into the open, as
industry views would be based on publicly available data and expounded in
published recommendations. Still, more work is needed to understand the
potential impacts and industry reception of planned adaptive regulation as
applied to autonomous vehicles. What appears clear, however, is that a
planned adaptive approach offers regulators the best opportunity to balance
safety, public confidence, and the realization of autonomous vehicles’ many
potential benefits in an increasingly fluid technological environment.
340

Nor is adaptive regulation desirable in every aspect of autonomous vehicle regulation.
The definition of what it means to be a driver, as discussed in Part II, or how humans are
licensed in autonomous vehicles, won’t need to be constantly adapted—they do not
necessarily depend on the details of the technology.
341
See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 933, 945-951 (detailing the potential costs of planned adaptive regulation); see also
HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (2011) (suggesting that planned adaptive regulation “requires more
resources than conventional [regulation], because doing it right requires taking the time to
carefully analyze the system at the outset, monitor the results, and periodically reassess and
revise”). These analyses, however, do not appear to consider any countervailing cost savings
which might result from an adaptive approach.
342
See Biber, supra note 341, at 945-51.
343
See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1305 (2012) (making this point in the context of
staging and sunsetting provisions).
344
See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 957 (discussing why administrative agencies may
be reluctant to embrace adaptive management).
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CONCLUSION
The rise of autonomous vehicles promises significant social, economic,
and environmental benefits. At the same time, their rapid emergence and
evolution pose a unique challenge to the federal and state regulators tasked with
ensuring their safe and successful adoption. In particular, as with a growing
number of new technologies, autonomous vehicles strain the reactive and
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions. At the heart of this tension are
several characteristics of traditional sources of regulation—legislatures,
agencies, and courts—which make it difficult, if not impossible, for the law to
keep pace with new technologies. Although regulators have attempted to address
this pacing problem in a number of ways, including through inaction, precaution,
and proactivity, these responses suffer from shortcomings equal to or greater
than those caused by the underlying defect. This problem has placed lawmakers
in a difficult position and increases the risk that autonomous vehicles will fail to
achieve widespread adoption.
To address this quandary and maximize the benefits of autonomous
vehicles, I have argued that lawmakers should draw on the principles of planned
adaptive regulation. A planned adaptive approach to regulating autonomous
vehicle operation and design would require the institutionalization of
monitoring-adjustment frameworks which allow for incremental policy
adjustments. Although this would be a sharp departure from traditional static
models of regulation and could impose new costs on agencies and regulated
entities, it offers significant advantages over static systems. Most importantly,
rather than attempting to treat the pacing problem’s symptoms through ex ante
“best guess” regulation, a planned adaptive approach directly targets its root
causes through institutional reforms. More work is needed to understand the
potential impacts and reception of planned adaptive regulation, as well as to
detail the mechanics of implementing such a system. Nevertheless, this article
offers the first comprehensive analysis of the full scope and implications of the
pacing problem and, based on that analysis, the outline for a corresponding
regulatory solution in the context of autonomous vehicles.

